Jul 31, 2010

Buffalo Soldiers!!


Buffalo Soldiers in DC:
29 July 2010:

Congresswoman Maxine Waters (D-CA) met with 12 original Buffalo Soldiers from the 9th & 10th (Horse) Cavalry and 24th Infantry Regiment who served in World War II. They visited her in Washington, DC office yesterday while in town attending the 144th Anniversary Reunion of the Buffalo Soldiers. Buffalo Soldier Day is celebrated July 28. Throughout the year they visit schools, churches and community groups to raise awareness about the historic challenges and accomplishments of the Buffalo Soldiers.

From left: Trooper Bruce Dennis; Trooper Albert Curley; Trooper James Madison; Trooper Harold S. Cole; House Veterans’ Affairs Committee Chairman Bob Filner (D-CA); Trooper Ernest Collier; Congresswoman Waters; Trooper Al Benson; Trooper James Cooper; and Trooper Andrew Aaron.
July 29, 2010.

Jul 30, 2010

Brit Op in Nad Ali


30 July 2010 Last updated at 08:06 ET
UK troops launch Operation Tor Shezada in Afghanistan

By Ian Pannell

BBC News, Helmand Military chiefs said Operation Tor Shezada got off to a "successful" start. Hundreds of British soldiers have launched an operation against Taliban insurgents in Afghanistan.

Operation Tor Shezada began early on Friday morning in Helmand province in the south of the country.

Soldiers from the 1st Battalion The Duke of Lancaster's Regiment are trying to clear the Taliban from an important stronghold in the Nad Ali district. The Brigade Reconnaissance Force (BRF) was among the first wave of troops.

UK troops in Afghanistan
Under cover of darkness, this small elite unit launched an airborne assault deep into insurgent-held territory.

Operation Tor Shezada, which means black prince, is a mission to seize a Taliban-controlled town in central Helmand and try to restore government rule.

Hundreds of British and Afghan forces are moving by land and air towards the town of Saidabad. It is one of the areas that UK forces were unable to clear during Operation Moshtarak earlier this year. As many as 180 insurgents are believed to use the town as a base; it is where bombs are made, attacks are planned and injured fighters are treated.

The area is seeded with IEDs, the home-made bombs that have killed and maimed so many soldiers and civilians. When troops have entered the area in the past they have encountered stiff resistance.

In the words of the commanding officer, Lt Col Fraser Lawrence, they will try to "steal" Saidabad but are "prepared to fight for it".

The BBC's Ian Pannell examines the aims of Operation Tor Shezada

Maj Marcus Mudd, the commander of the BRF, said his troops would be dropping in behind enemy lines.

In an eve-of-battle address, he urged his men to move quickly to win over the local population with the message that the Nato-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) would be here to stay.

Radio broadcasts have been used to warn people that this operation is taking place, although it is unclear how many will have been able to hear the message.

Frank Gardner BBC security correspondent --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
There are two ways of viewing Operation Tor Shezada.
On the positive side, the area now being 'cleared' of Taliban is said to be the last remaining centre of population in the Nad Ali area not yet under Afghan government control. This is a joint operation with the Afghan army, a continuation of the largely successful process of British troops mentoring and partnering their Afghan allies.

But on the negative side one might well ask why, if Nad Ali has been officially such a success, do hundreds of British and Afghan soldiers need to risk their lives going in to clear an area (Saidabad) that we had never heard of but is apparently a hotbed of Taliban insurgents?

The truth is that clearing central Helmand of insurgents, then bringing in elements of government that the local population can actually trust, is taking rather longer than commanders had hoped.

The Taliban have certainly lost a safe haven there this year, but they have not gone away. They are lurking in the background, intimidating locals not to co-operate with Nato and the Afghan government, and waiting for the day when foreign forces pull out. And they believe they can sweep aside government forces and reassert control.
Operation Tor Shehzade may well achieve short-term tactical success. The challenge will be to see if it delivers lasting security.

It is a mark of how controversial the issue of civilian casualties is that Maj Mudd cautioned his men to show restraint, telling them "if we fail to protect the population, we will fail in our mission".

Until a few years ago, Nad Ali was a relatively peaceful district in the central Helmand river valley.

But the combination of a corrupt and brutal police force and an abusive local government, together with an aggressive poppy eradication programme, turned it into a virulent insurgent stronghold.

Local farmers, with encouragement and support from the Taliban, took up arms, creating additional strain on Britain's already overstretched troops.

Operation Black Prince is just the latest in a series of missions over the last year-and-a-half that have attempted to "clear" the insurgents from the district.

There has been progress.
Most of the towns and villages here are no longer under the complete control of the Taliban. The media and politicians are regularly flown in to witness what the military see as a success story.

But the veneer of normality is dangerously thin. The Taliban have always been able to exert influence far beyond their numerical strength.

It is true that intimidation is the weapon of choice when it comes to coercing the local population, but there is also genuine support for insurgents who are largely drawn from the area.

Shopkeepers in the district centre complain that security is not good.

They insist that the Taliban still operate just 2km away and they fear being caught up in the fighting. Motorcycle mechanic Sultan Mohammed wants the government to talk to the Taliban.

"You cannot bring peace by fighting - war is not the answer," he told me.

A large crowd gathered to listen in, nodding in agreement.

When asked whom they would like to see in charge in Nad Ali - the government, army, foreign forces or the insurgents - they all agreed that they wanted the Taliban.

In a rare insight into the insurgency they insisted that people do not join the Taliban for the money.

This contradicts ISAF's categorisation of the bulk of fighters as "$10 Taliban", who are susceptible to inducements to switch to the government side.

Instead, the men told me that the Taliban are people motivated by religion, anger at corrupt police and local officials and affront at the presence of foreign, non-Muslim soldiers in their midst.

Yet the military insists Nad Ali is a model of progress.

Lt Col Fraser Lawrence says Operation Moshtarak, which took place here and in neighbouring Marjah earlier this year, was "a huge success".

But attacks and casualties have continued to mount in both areas. The US Marine Corps to the South West of here is struggling with a resurgent Taliban.

A combination of influence and intimidation means that progress has been far slower than first predicted by military commanders.

Sultan Mohammed wants the government to open dialogue with the Taliban
Operation Tor Shezada is only possible because extra British forces have been brought in to Afghanistan.

The transfer of other troops from areas like Sangin will also increase their ability to tackle the insurgency later this year.

But the challenge in Helmand is, and always has been, to win over the local population. As British troops embark on another bloody summer in Afghanistan, it is a battle they have yet to win.

Jul 29, 2010

Understanding the Human Terrain: Key to Success in Afghanistan


Understanding the Human Terrain: Key to Success in Afghanistan

Posted by SMALL WARS JOURNAL Editors on July 16, 2010

Understanding the Human Terrain: Key to Success in Afghanistan
by Andrew Garfield

General Petraeus, in his recent Senate Confirmation Hearing, reminded everyone that in Afghanistan, as in Iraq, “the key terrain is the human terrain.” Taking and holding the human terrain is the essential prerequisite for ultimate success in Afghanistan, as it was in Iraq. This battle for control of and support from a contested population can only be won if we understand the Afghan people, whose cooperation, trust and support we are trying to secure. Armed with this understanding, we can navigate the human terrain successfully. Without it, we continue to be confused by the complexities of their culture, faith and society; oblivious to their desires, grievances and opinions; distracted by the lies and distortions of our enemies; and blind to opportunities to enhance our reputation.

In much of Eastern and Southern Afghanistan today, the Taliban hide, recruit, train, prepare and attack from safe havens provided by the local Pashtun population. They remain hidden for extended periods simply by hiding in plain sight; well known to elements of the local population who are unwilling or unable to challenge their presence. If we are to challenge the Taliban in Kandahar and elsewhere in Afghanistan, and enhance the influence and effectiveness of the Afghan Government, our soldiers and diplomats must understand fully the society and culture in which they operate.

To develop an in depth understanding of the human terrain, one must first conduct comprehensive, systematic, timely, and ethically appropriate social science research and analysis. In order to do so, one must operate in the field and conduct primary face-to-face research, utilizing all available sources. One cannot learn how to navigate the human terrain in Afghanistan from the Internet.

Social Science research, which is primarily face to face research, helps our military understand why so many Kandaharis support the Taliban or are willing to turn a blind eye to their activities. It tells them what Afghans’ expect from their Government and what they need to survive and prosper. It tells our military how to avoid cultural missteps and explains the narratives that they must understand and utilize in order to communicate effectively with the population. It identifies Taliban behaviors and excesses that the population rejects and can be exploited, while providing Afghan perspectives on how to exert pressure on, and reconcile with, the Taliban.

Yet, far too little effort has been dedicated to the systematic, on-the-ground collection of this essential socio-cultural information. This type of human terrain data is being collected, however the budget for its collection is minuscule in relation to its importance. In addition to budgetary constraints, such research collection is attacked regularly by ivory tower academics that falsely question research ethics and methods based on personal ideologies, instead of defending the lives of Afghans, and U.S. military and civilian personnel.

Our military and diplomats must be given direct access to the full range of Social Science field research capabilities as a means to protect themselves and the people they engage and support. If this access is denied for budgetary, ideological or methodological reasons, many more Afghan civilians, and American and Allied soldiers will die, allowing the Taliban to prevail.

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Andrew Garfield is the Founder of Glevum Associates, a Massachusetts-based social science research and analysis company that conducts extensive multi-disciplinary face-to-face research in Afghanistan and Iraq on behalf of the Department of Defense and other clients.