White House on Harvard & ROTC

Statement by the Press Secretary on Harvard’s Decision to
Welcome the ROTC Back to Campus

March 4,2011

THE WHITE HOUSE

The decision by Harvard University to formally welcome the Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps to its campus is an important step in moving past the old divisions that often kept many Americans from seeing what we share with one another,
including love of country and a profound respect for our brave men and women in uniform. After signing legislation last year ending “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” President Obama used his State of the Union address to call on all college campuses to open their doors to our military recruiters and the ROTC. With our nation at war, this sends a powerful message that Americans stand united and that our colleges,
society and armed forces are stronger when we honor the contributions of all our citizens, especially our troops and military families who sacrifice for our freedoms. As the President said in the State of the Union, it is time to move forward as one nation. ///

Gate's Troop Cut ideas

This is what Sect Gates proposes:

Navy end strength 324K cuts 0K 0% cut
USAF end strength 331K cuts 0K 0% cut
Army Guard end strength 358K cuts 0K 0% cut
USAF Guard end strength 106K cuts 0K 0% cut
Army Civ's end strength 250K cuts 0K 0% cut
Navy Civ's end strength 199K cuts 0K 0% cut
USAF Civ's end strength 177K cuts 0K 0% cut
DoD Civ's end strength 126K cuts 0K 0% cut

Army end strength 562K cuts 49K - 8.7% cut
USMC end strength 203K cuts 49K - 9.8% cut

Yet who's putting Boots-on-the-ground...?

Projecting Power in the 21st Century

USS Bataan; Norfolk, Va. “An amphibious operation can be as prominent or as low-key as desired,” BrigGen Christopher Owens, USMC, said, “You’d be surprised to learn there have been 106 amphibious operations in the last 20 years, and only 2 were combat ops.” Owens, the 2nd Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) Commanding General, is the co-commander, along with Rear Admiral Kevin Scott who commands Expeditionary Strike Group 2 (ESG-2), in overseeing Exercise Bold Alligator.

Bold Alligator is a seven day “virtual exercise” designed to reacquaint brigade and group level commands with their amphibious doctrine, tactical skill sets and logistical requirements. With the Marines and Navy landlocked after nine years fighting in Afghanistan and Iraq, the exercise is Marine Commandant Gen James Amos’s opening effort to return the Marine Corps to its expeditionary roots in concert with the Navy.

Comprised of 450 Marines and sailors spread over eight ships, the scenario combines a country invading its neighbor, an emergency evacuation of American and friendly civilians, and all of occurring in the midst a sudden onslaught of local sectarian violence. Bold Alligator provides realistic training as it is similar to situations that have occurred recently in many parts of the world. “It’s all taken from recent real-world situations,” explained LtCol Owen Richwine, who developed it. “Amphibious operations are far more complex than the Marines storming the beach at Tarawa. Think of this as a combination of Iraq invading Kuwait in 1991, the Shia-Sunni carnage in 2005-2006, and the Marines evacuating embassy personnel and civilians from Liberia in 1999.”

Such a complex mission requires the ability to respond rapidly, land and sustain a credible force ashore by both sea and air, all while organizing the evacuation of thousands of non-combatants including transportation to intermediate evacuation sites. These are capabilities that can only be provided by amphibious forces, with their unique blend of land-sea-air capabilities.

The simulation is complex; the 450 participants are controlling a virtual force of 11,000 Marines from a MEB and an ESG consisting of 20 ships (15 amphibious, 1 cruiser, 3 destroyers, 1 frigate) and supporting naval units including a Naval Beach Group, a Fleet Surgical Team, Maritime Expeditionary Security Forces, and a Tactical Air Control Group. In reality, the USS Bataan is the flagship, with the USS Iwo Jima and seven multiple simulation centers located from Norfolk to Camp Lejeune involved.

The virtual enemy is an accurate recreation of a robust 3rd-world army, with some 12,000 personnel, a mechanized division, and an assortment of tanks, artillery, and vehicles. Similar to Iraq, shadowy insurgent forces appear at inopportune moments, and through the course of each days events, Richwine’s Action Group threw different scenarios at the participants.

The importance of amphibious operations in the 21st century as led by ‘big decks’ such as the USS Bataan (LHD-5) can be assumed by the visit of Marine general officers and Navy Flag officers. Assistant Commandant Gen Joseph Dunford and Deputy Commandant, Combat Development LtGen George Flynn. They joined Vice Admiral Daniel Holloway, Commander, 2nd Fleet and Director-Combined Joint Operations, and Rear Admiral Dennis Fitzpatrick, Commander Strike Force Training-Atlantic. Dunford is long a believer in the multitude of options presented by amphibious operations. “We look at where we need to go in the future and we may need Marines to come from the sea," adding that future operations will vary from humanitarian and disaster relief to amphibious assault.

Prior actual amphibious operations have historically been small; when the 24th MEU pulled the American citizens off the Beirut beaches when the Israeli-Hezbollah war erupted, it involved only three ships. Even during the intense relief operations following the Haitian earthquake, the 22nd MEU, 24th MEU, and Navy relief forces operated autonomously, with only unofficial coordination between the commands. The goal of Bold Alligator is to coordinate the much larger MEB-ESG force for maximum efficiency in resolving the virtual crisis.

The most important difference between the multiple involved ships of Bold Alligator and humanitarian operations such as Haiti is the command structure. “We have a clear understanding of supported versus supporting roles,” Scott told Military.com, “We’re responsible for getting the Marines to the shore, and then they’re responsible from there.”

With the MEB-ESG forces comprising Bold Alligator far larger than the usual MEU, the MEB-ESG force is learning to fully utilize the strengths of 20 ships and 11,000 Marines. “This will enable us to develop the SOP a MEB-ESG requires” Richwine said. “Amphibious operations provide the United States the ability to conduct military operations, provide humanitarian aid, or pull Americans to safety; this is the best way of projecting power quickly and effectively."

Farm Aid - Working Well in A'stan

To Suppress Taliban, U.S. Deploys Farm Aid
By Yaroslav Trofimov
Wall Street Journal
May 19, 2010

BABA SAHEB, Afghanistan— Dozens of goggle-clad laborers converged at the Lalay family orchard at dawn, spraying pomegranate trees with soap water against parasites.

They were paid by U.S. taxpayers, as are tens of thousands of laborers across southern Afghanistan who have been put to work in a $360 million program—one of the biggest yet—aiming to suppress the insurgency in the Taliban's cradle.

Afghanistan Vouchers for Increased Production in Agriculture, or Avipa Plus, injects cash into villages, helping farmers with seeds, fertilizer and advice in exchange for collaboration with the Afghan government.

Kandahar and Helmand, the southern provinces where the bulk of this money is spent, are the focus of this year's U.S. military surge that seeks to roll back Taliban advances.

In recent months, as the military pushed back the insurgents, the Avipa program helped jumpstart the economy and prop up Afghan authorities. The program doesn't always work: in some Taliban-heavy areas, such as Marjah, in Helmand province, villagers often spurn American aid for fear of Taliban reprisal.

U.S. officials say disbursing large amounts of cash and supplies from Avipa, which comes up for budget renewal in August, isn't sustainable in the long term. But unless the security situation is turned around in the coming year, they add, there may not be any long-term Western aid presence here.

Avipa has made headway in several strategic districts, including Arghandab, a lush farming belt north of Kandahar city.

Last fall, district Gov. Hajji Abdul Jabbar would drive up to his office from Kandahar city two or three times a week, idle a few hours, and then return home. He had no authority and few locals bothered to visit him.

Then, the Avipa money suddenly rendered him relevant. To get cash and aid, village elders must first pledge to cooperate with Mr. Jabbar against insurgent attacks in their area, and coordinate implementation of the program with his office.

As more American money flowed in, the crowds grew bigger at the shuras, or meetings, at the governor's office on a compound that he shares with the U.S. military. Avipa is spending $23 million in Arghandab, home to 50,000 people.

"This provides leverage: the locals have to provide some security or otherwise they'll lose the economic stimulus," says Lt. Col. Guy Jones, commander of the U.S. Army unit responsible for Arghandab, the 2nd Battalion of the 508th Parachute Infantry Regiment.

In the previous three years, he adds, insurgent attacks in Arghandab peaked in mid-May. This year so far, despite occasional attacks, the area hasn't seen a similar surge. "Nowadays, when someone shows up from Pakistan and says, here is 5,000 afghanis ($100), go plant a bomb, people won't listen anymore: they already have jobs," the district governor says.

Avipa, implemented by Virginia-based International Relief and Development under a United States Agency for International Development contract, usually pays Afghan laborers $5 a day. "Before, we never saw an aid program of such scope," said Abdul Hai, a village elder who came to watch the work in the Lalay orchard before going to a shura. "We're full of hope that we'll increase our harvests this year."

New techniques and supplies provided by Avipa can increase yields by some 30%, significantly increasing revenue, translating into thousands of dollars in additional revenue per hectare, according to Travis Gartner, a Nebraska farmer and former Marine who oversees the program in south Afghanistan.

Parts of the program—such as the orchard pruning—have provided the coalition forces with a direct tactical benefit, denying the Taliban the concealment of overgrown vegetation.

The Taliban have assassinated village elders and farmers who benefit from the program, and attacked a compound of International Relief and Development compound in Helmand.

"The Taliban come at night and insist: 'don't take any benefits from the foreigners and the government,' " says Dad Mohammad, an elder from a village near the Lalay orchard. "But our economy is farming, and we have nothing else here. There is at least one person from every family in the village working on these projects. The Taliban can't stop us."

Haiti - Let the Military Lead the Response

Put The Pentagon In Charge
Newsweek.com
January 15, 2010
By John Barry


Why the U.S. military is the only organization that can effectively manage the chaos in Haiti. And other hard truths about the disaster.

As the international relief effort descends on Haiti, there are certain truths that nobody wants to acknowledge publicly. The first is that few of those still buried under the rubble can be saved. There will, of course, be stories of miracle rescues. But the reality, says Fred Krimgold, earthquake expert at Virginia Tech, is that "a very, very high percentage of the people who are rescued are found in the first few hours. The drop-off is significant after that. By the time the rescue teams and sniffer dogs and fancy equipment arrive, you're really left with the exceptional situations, the freak survivals." Many of those lucky enough to be pulled from the rubble will die too, succumbing to what disaster-relief experts call "crush injuries" from the rubble that entombed them. The toxins these injuries release in the body typically overwhelm the kidneys. Without dialysis, the injured tend to die—and nobody brings dialysis machines to a disaster zone.

The other truth is that the only entity on the planet with the capacity to bring help to Haiti on the scale needed is the U.S. military. The United Nations will find it impolitic to admit this; the big international relief groups, proud of their noncombatant status, will shy from acknowledging it. But it is the reality.

Journalists in Port-au-Prince ask the persistent question: "Who's in charge?" The answer is a quiet-spoken U.S. Special Forces officer from a tiny township on the Kentucky River. Lt. Gen. P. K. (Ken) Keen is deputy commander of U.S. Southern Command, and the man tapped to run the American relief effort in Haiti. It's a task that will tax Keen's diplomatic as well as organizational skills as he navigates the politics of international disaster relief.

Formally, Keen—who is in Port-au-Prince—will take his orders from the U.S. ambassador to Haiti, Kenneth Merten. Formally, the official with lead responsibility within the Washington bureaucracy is the administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), Rajiv Shah—who's been in the job for all of one week. Formally, the aid from international donors is pulled together by the U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.

But the reality is that what materials and assistance are delivered to Haiti, how much, and when, will depend almost wholly on a network of relationships established on the ground between the U.S. military, a handful of disaster experts from USAID, and five or six of the biggest NGOs already working in Haiti: World Vision, CARE, Save the Children, Oxfam, and one or two others. As experts from Europe arrive, they will be slotted into this network. In practice, these emergency relief workers are a global cadre; they know each other from years' together at one disaster scene after another. And the roles are clear. The relief workers figure out what's needed, and draw up their lists. The AID liaison staffers with the U.S. military prioritize the requests and sign off on them. The military brings the goods into the country. The big NGOs distribute them, with emergency access to U.S. government funds to hire local contractors.

It's a system built up over 20 years; and—belying the chaos on the streets—it works efficiently. There is even a how-to manual: FOG, it's inappropriately called, the Field Operations Guide, which was intended to be a pocket manual, but has now swollen to 378 pages of accumulated know-how.

But none of this can function except on the bedrock of U.S. military capability, as the first days of chaos in Haiti have again demonstrated. Haiti's communications were destroyed in the quake; the U.S. military's first task was to set up a new network. Supplies couldn't be flown into Port-au-Prince airport until the U.S. military had sent in airport repair and cargo-handling teams.

The port is unusable because many of the wharves are rubble and most of the cranes have collapsed. Heavy-lift helicopters flying off the carrier USS Carl Vinson are the only way of getting most supplies ashore. When the USS Bataan, one of the Marines' amphibious assault carriers, arrives off Haiti with the dock landing ship USS Fort McHenry, their hovercraft will take up the cargo-ferrying effort. To distribute relief supplies around the shattered country, only the U.S. military has the transport; many of the NGOs' vehicles were damaged in the quake. To keep order and reassure a frantic populace, a company of the 82nd Airborne is already there, and a 3,500-strong brigade will be in place over the weekend.

On Friday, the U.S. military was stepping up its leadership role. The Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff, Adm. Mike Mullen, said that up to 10,000 U.S. troops would be operating in or near Haiti by Monday, with the possibility of more being added later. And the State Department said Haitian Prime Minister Jean-Max Bellerive signed a document turning over control of the Port-au-Prince airport to the U.S. government indefinitely. These are crucial steps in the right direction.

The U.S. military won't be welcome in Haiti for long. Ironically, one of the first signs of Haitian revival will, predictably, be protests at the American presence. For now, though, it's the American armed forces that stand between Haiti and utter collapse.