Showing posts with label inferior leadership. Show all posts
Showing posts with label inferior leadership. Show all posts

Feb 26, 2011

Will Middle Eastern Democracies be Friends or Foes?


Will Middle Eastern Democracies be Friends or Foes?

Citing the Reichstag fire just one month after to solidify his grip on power, Hitler shredded the constitution and outlawed all other political parties. Six years later WWII began, costing some 60 million lives

The Americano
By J.D. Gordon
25 Feb 2011

Many in the West have cheered the prospect of Western-style democracies taking hold in the Mid-East, siding with protest movements that have toppled autocratic regimes in Egypt and Tunisia while spreading like dominoes to Yemen, Bahrain, Jordan, Libya and Algeria.

That’s a natural reaction, given the fact that democracies have yielded successful outcomes in Western societies and embodied the concepts of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.

However, a closer look at existing social conditions in the Middle East and North Africa, combined with a quick glance at some past “democracies” ought to give one pause.

In condemning violent crackdowns, United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay cited the root of anger as, “decades of neglect of people’s aspirations to realize not only civil and political rights, but also economic, social and cultural rights.”

While true, it doesn’t address why there has been so much neglect of people’s aspirations. As if a sudden switch to democracy might fix everything?

Realistically speaking, most Middle Eastern and North African countries don’t enjoy the social conditions that would fulfill such needs – regardless of the type government.

There religious leaders wield the type of power and influence over daily lives in ways we haven’t seen in America for centuries. And their standard fare is preaching intolerance, demanding subservience of women, and blaming the West and Israel for all their problems. In a society of devout followers, most people naturally become conditioned to view the West unfavorably, just as public polls show. Truly representative democracies under these circumstances would likely be deeply hostile to U.S. interests.

Those still pushing democracy for the sake of an egalitarian “power to the people” should at least take a look at some case studies. History is full of notionally democratic, yet also deeply troubled societies that do not have happy endings.

For instance:

Germany, 1933 – As the elected leader of the Weimar Republic’s Majority Nazi Party, Adolph Hitler was appointed as Chancellor by octogenarian President Paul von Hindenburg to form a coalition government that would pull Germany out of the Great Depression. Citing the Reichstag fire just one month after to solidify his grip on power, Hitler shredded the constitution and outlawed all other political parties. Six years later WWII began, costing some 60 million lives.

Iran, 1979 – After a pro-democracy movement toppled the U.S.-backed Shah, the Mullahs quickly instituted Sharia Law — legitimized through a national referendum. Declaring that protests against the Ayatollah were the same as protests against God, Iran has ruthlessly suppressed any form of dissent ever since. Dedicated to its nuclear program in pursuit of regional dominance, Iran is just years away from producing the bomb.

Algeria, 1991 – In reaction to centuries of colonization and a few decades of secular yet incompetent autocratic leaders, Algerians elected the Islamic Salvation Front which promised to enact Sharia Law. Seeing the nightmare that unfolded in Iran, Algeria’s Army launched a coup and removed the Islamists from their elected posts. The result? A decade long civil war that killed over 150,000 people.

Venezuela, 1999 – Failing to take power in a coup, Hugo Chavez was elected by a populist movement fed up with poverty and a lack of social mobility. Since then, the murder rate has quadrupled, foreign investment has all but dried up, and chronic food shortages plague the nation.

Gaza, 2006 – Once Palestinians finally had the chance to pick their elected leaders, they chose Hamas, an internationally recognized terrorist organization. Cut off from Western aid, Hamas wasted little time before firing rockets into Israel.

So what can we learn from all this?

First, though democracy may represent the ideal form of government, successful ones must be accompanied by the social conditions that can lead to positive results for its people.

Second, instant democracies in the Middle East and North Africa are most likely to result in highly antagonistic nations, given the prevailing anti-Western sentiments and climate of intolerance. This is particularly true if Islamist parties like the Muslim Brotherhood come to power – either directly via general elections, or through steamrolling political opposition within their respective legislatures.

Navigating this crisis will be difficult for America, even with the wisest policy decisions from Washington. If the current administration’s waffling through the Egyptian chaos gives any indication of things to come, we may be in real trouble.

================
J.D. Gordon is a communications consultant to several Washington, DC think tanks and a retired Navy Commander who served in the office of the secretary of defense from 2005 to 2009 as the Pentagon’s spokesman for the Western Hemisphere. For more info: www.jdgordoncommunications.com [1]

Jan 7, 2011

Letter from Karachi


Letter from Karachi
By Taimur Khan
Foreign Affairs

"An influx of working poor into Pakistan's cities is leading to violent competition over land and political loyalties -- not to mention changing the very social fabric of the country. Will Karachi, and Pakistan as a whole, be able to adapt?"

Read in on Foreign Affairs: http://www.foreignaffairs.com/node/67173

Aug 10, 2010

Pakistan Passport Fraud Promotes Terror


Fake Passports
By Ali K Chisti
10 Aug 2010
DAILY TIMES (Karachi)

Imagine if al Qaeda and the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) train a team of suicide bombers in FATA and send them to the US and all the European capitals to carry out a series of suicide bombings and 26/11-style fidai attacks?

A logical question countering the argument would be: who will provide the logistics and visas? Well, there is no need for one, now: thanks to dozens of fake and stolen European passports readily available in Pakistan.

A European passport not only insures you visa free entry to the EU countries but a visa on arrival for the US and Canada – countries which are at the forefront of the war against terrorism.

And there had been precedents. In 1993 a top al Qaeda member later turned FBI informant, Ali Muhammad helped al Qaeda’s number two, Dr Ayman al-Zawahiri enter the United States with a “fake passport” and tour San Francisco Bay area mosques to raise money to fund al Qaeda. Later, Sheikh Muhammad Atta of Al Qaeda’s Hamburg Cell and one of the hijackers who carried out 9/11: flied to Karachi, Pakistan some time between 1999-2001 on a fraudulent Belgian passport to eventually move to Kabul, and just before 9/11 two al Qaeda assassins posing as French journalists with stolen French passports exploded themselves and killed Ahmed Shah Masood – the leader of the Northern Alliance.

The Daily Times could now confirm that fake passports are widely available in Pakistan, which could be used by terrorists and money launderers to carry out terrorist activity flying out of country from Pakistan. A foreign diplomatic who was shown these passports claimed that, “they are the best, I have seen” adding that, “another Kasab or Faisal Shahzad from Pakistan result in diplomatic ties with Pakistan”. The counterfeits are cheap, realistic and available if you know the right people. We only got to know about the availability of such passports via someone who has recently applied for political asylum from Pakistan in the UK (thanks to the lax asylum system of Britain which allows a foreign national to apply for political asylum on the port of entry). The hub of such counterfeit and stolen passports apparently is none other than Bangkok from where Eastern European and Pakistani gangs operate. During our investigation; we approached one of the agents named Mehmood in Karachi who assured us that he would provide us a European passport and would ensure that we go through the Pakistani immigration and take a flight to any European destination.

On enquiry Mehmood (the agent) assured that if you are caught in Europe there’s always a way to “apply for political asylum”. “Would this get me on board to the US?” “You can try – it has worked before...,” comes the reply.

These passports costing from Rs 1,50,000 to Rs 350,000 ($1,765-$4,117) are available in Pakistani markets but “there’s a difference” one of the agents told us. One is a “forged” one and another, a “stolen” one. A stolen EU passport costs somewhere around Rs 500,000 to 700,000 in Pakistan and is mainly used by human smugglers although there are precedents that such passports had been used by high-profile al Qaeda and Taliban operatives to conceal their identity and travel abroad.

There is another way an agent told us. “You can go to Dubai on a regular Pakistani passports and from there you can use these passports to go to any of the European cities.”

Upon enquiry with the Dubai authorities and with the Ministry of the Interior, Abu Dhabi, they confirmed such incidents occur and that, only recently, a Mossad hit-squad in Dubai used similar European passports. The Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) whose primary responsibility is to put a cap on such forgery mission statement is, “to achieve excellence in FIA by promoting culture of merit, providing continuous professional training, ensuring effective internal accountability, encouraging use of technology and having a meaningful mechanism”.

As it turn out from our investigation that, not a single such case had been detected at any of the major airports recently although, the FIA is aware of such passports. When asked as to the detection mechanism used by Immigration authorities and law enforcement authorities at ports? The answer we get is, “from experience and human intelligence” - apparently, there is no database of stolen passports, no Interpol records nor any coordination from foreign embassies and vice versa whatsoever. A security analyst who had been on the top slot at the FIA confirmed, “that there are black sheep around” but, “with Rehman Malik as the interior minister, serious funds had come to FIA and the level of professionalism has increased”.

During the course of investigations, Daily Times could confirm that, these passports do go through to the scanners and machines without a “red-flag” being raised at least two airports in Pakistan: Quaid-e-Azam International Airport in Karachi and Benazir Bhutto International Airport in Islamabad, while Alama Iqbal Airport turned out to be easiest where officials would take bribes to get people on board.

Remember, as per Civil Aviation and country laws which varies if an illegal passenger boards an airplane and is caught, the airline in our case, the PIA, is fined hundreds of thousands of dollars. On contacting PIA – an official from PIA confirmed that, due to illegal passengers only last year – PIA had been fined over one hundred thousand dollars.

The British Home Office and Border Controls gave out an official statement on our story. “Everyone entering and leaving the UK is required to produce a valid document, establishing their identity, nationality and citizenship.” All documents are checked against the UK and Interpol watch lists and a Border Force officer will also undertake checks to establish that the document is valid and belongs to the rightful holder” while, “As well as electronic checks, the UK Border Agency has specially trained forgery officers, whose role is to check documents and provide advice to colleagues.”

In response to our claim that stolen and forged UK passports can be bought - An Identity and Passport Service spokesperson said: “We remain confident that through its combination of physical and electronic security features the British passport remains a highly secure document, meeting rigorous international standards. “The Identity and Passport Service utilise encryption technology that ensures the encoded data on the chip contained within the British passport cannot be changed or modified. If an attempt is made to alter the data in the passport, through its combination of physical and electronic security features, this will be picked up at Border Control.

“Any passport which has been reported as lost of stolen is cancelled by IPS and rendered invalid for travel.” The good officer, Mr Carlos Vázquez, Counsellor of Interior, Embassy of Spain, Islamabad, when contacted gave out a statement that, “investigations are currently on”. The whole point of this story is not to undermine Pakistan’s security or enforcement forces as the fake passports are widely available from the United Kingdom to Spain to the US, but to blow a whistle and point out that such documents could be used by none other than the TTP or any other terrorist organisation to carry out terrorist activity inside the United States or any European country, the last thing we want is another, Ajmal Kasab or Shehzad Tanweer.

Aug 9, 2010

Doctors Murdered by the Taliban


Monday, August 9, 2010

Three Seasoned Professionals Senselessly Murdered
By Kanani Fong
www.TheKitchenDisptach.com

"Let him grieve undistracted, without having to worry about how he looked in mine or anyone else’s eyes. Death is a strange and complete entity. In plain sight of death we contemplate our own mortality and that sensation of loss that is so fucking unfair." --The late British surgeon Karen Woo, writing on her blog about her fiance's need to grieve after losing two friends in a plane crash in Afghanistan. Now, he grieves for her.

Still reeling over the bad news of the volunteer medical team of ten doctors, nurses and other workers who were executed point blank in the Kuran Wa Munjan district of Badakhshan. In a conversation with a friend on the ground after it happened, many think this wasn't exclusively a Taliban hit, rather the work of Jihadi tourists, who come over with no ties to these remote regions to kill infidels. In the Irish Times, Michael Semple gives us a clearer picture, a veritable definition of lawlessness:

"Outsiders have no brothers or cousins to act as a deterrent against violence.
Killers of outsiders, even if they are really bandits, can claim moral
authority and enhance their reputation as purveyors of violence. Political
groups with limited control on the ground can claim responsibility for such
extreme acts of violence as a way of trying to project themselves beyond
their real limits of influence."

While many have jumped to the conclusion that this was a Christian group carrying bibles translated into Dari, it's been rebuffed by a variety of sources that humanitarian aid groups like this use their faith not to proselytize as has been accused, but as a source of inner strength to carry out good works. Faith in the broadest sense pulls everyone through tough times. Furthermore, groups like the International Assistance Mission accept help from a variety of health care professionals, and they don't make anyone take a Jesus test before signing on.

Killers do not distinguish between non-Christian or Christian groups. In 2004, five workers with Doctors Without Borders were ambushed and killed. This lead to the withdrawal of services from the organization in Afghanistan until 2009.

Those killed weren't novices when it came to the area. Tom Little, an eye surgeon, had given much of his professional career to one of the world's poorest regions. He oversaw three 40-bed hospitals in three larger cities, as well as three 10-bed clinics in remote outposts, under the NOOR (National Organization For Opthmalic Rehabilitation), a project of the International Assistance Mission (IAM). Little's wife also worked with him, however was back in upstate NY at the time of the murders. Their daughter was in a different region of Afghanistan, carrying out humanitarian work as well.

In addition, another of the murdered was Dan Terry. Terry had also given his entire life's work to the region. As the son of the man who founded the International Assistance Mission, Terry lived in the area for 30 years, raising his children there. He was described by Tim Lynch as:

"The Godfather of Free Range International – the man who pioneered the techniques, tactics and procedures we use to travel in remote districts was executed last week in Badakhshan Province. Dan Terry was a good man. He was humble, self-effacing, and competent. He lived in Afghanistan with his family and spoke fluent Dari and Pashto."
Another of those murdered was Dr. Karen Woo, a British physician who had forsaken her practice in the UK to bring medicine to Afghanistan. She was running services for women and children --urgently needed since women there never go to a male physician.

One can't help but be captivated by her voice. She was spirited, soulful, intelligent, a humanitarian, a seasoned surgeon, and fun. She has what we call the "X-Factor" times ten. She was capable funny and irreverent. This is from her last post, where she also does a hilarious knock down of politicians:

"Most of the time I listen to politicians on the TV with an autistic head on, you know the kind of head where you can instantly tell when someone is lying through their teeth or is simply delivering a foil of bullshit, liberally peppered with terms designed to disguise that there is absolutely nothing inside the hot air that they are spouting."

The politicians are sickening, as unlike the three people described here, they do very little in terms of hands-on work. They are given too much time and consideration.

I wish I had known all of them. Karen Woo was to have been married in two weeks time. Her gown was being made. Her fiancee, also in Afghanistan, had the terrible burden of having to identify his beloved's remains.

In all of this, the biggest losers are the Afghan people. As it was with those murdered at Ft. Hood, health care professionals willing to carry out their work in these kinds of condition are a rare breed. It is estimated that 250,000 Afghans were helped by the efforts of Dr. Tom Little. Now, another 250,000 will have to go without.

"In Memoriam
(From the IAM site)

Name Nationality Status

Mahram Ali Afghan Confirmed dead
Cheryl Beckett USA Confirmed dead
Daniela Beyer German Confirmed dead
Brian Carderelli USA Confirmed dead
Jawed Afghan Confirmed dead
Dr Tom Grams USA Confirmed dead
Glen Lapp USA Confirmed dead
Dr Tom Little USA Confirmed dead
Dan Terry USA Confirmed dead
Dr Karen Woo UK Confirmed dead


Thankfully, two of our Afghan eye camp team members survived, Mr. Said Yasin and Safiullah."

Jul 26, 2010

WikiLeaks: A View from Pakistan


The WikiLeaks Fiasco
by Ali K.Chishti
Daily Times

WikiLeaks, a Swedish whistleblower project which consists of activist journalists who had previously leaked videos and articles embarrassing the US Government Sunday leaked damaging 90,000 top secret documents of US military records consisting on cables, internal memos and emails sent out to various DoD officials related to Afghanistan revealing and again exposing i)how coalition forces have killed thousands of civilians in unreported incidents ii) Talibans attacks have soared and iii) and how NATO commanders fear neighboring Pakistan & Iran are fuelling the insurgency.

And while Obama’s national security adviser, Gen. James L.Jones (the same man McChrystal called an “oldie”) deplored the disclosure of classified information putting that it “would put the lives of Americans and US partners at risk”. A top Pakistani diplomat responded that, “the leaks are troubling and shows the nature of alliance and trust between the US & Pakistan which could only be termed as “damaging” to Pakistan and Pakistani Military”.

The most disturbing aspect of the WikiLeaks is the “ISI’s working alongside Al-Qaeda” to plan attacks and as the NYT puts it, “The behind the scene’s frustration of soldiers on the ground and flimpses of what appear to be Pakistani skullduggery contrast sharply with the frequently rosy public pronouncements of Pakistan as an ally by American officials, looking to sustain a drone campaign over parts of Pakistani territory to strike to Qaeda havens.” Another document on WikiLeaks describes how the ISI trains group of insurgents and has a pool of suicide bombers used to destabilize peace in Afghanistan. One such report from Dec, 18, 2006 describes how suicide bombers are recruited and trained in Pakistan and sent out on missions where ANP (Afghan National Police) helps them to carry out their missions.

While ISI official in Pakistan failed to comment on the WikiLeaks and would only do so after examining the papers, ISI and Pakistan have to do a lot more serious PR to get out this latest scandal. According to an embarrassed US Army official who works closely with Pakistanis commented on the whole WikiLeaks incident, “now we have to face an ISI who would be more angry and suspicious on us and where we think the whole WikiLeak is ISI specific and is definitely an attempt to strain relationship between the two allies”. Apparently the word "ISI" in 90,000 documents appeared more than 50,000+ times” said a source from WikiLeaks who himself sheepishly admitted that, “the Americans soldiers and CIA seems to be ISIphobic”. Accordingly to the WikiLeak, “we are not helping making an opinion about anyone – we are just interested in transparency”.

In what we call the most direct allegation on the Pakistani top-spy agency, the ISI the WikiLeaks gives an insiders view of how top American defense official’s view ISI role “who is rigidly hierarchical organization that has little tolerance for roge” activity”; where it is worth mentioning that according to WikiLeaks, ISI’s S-Wing which deals with external operations had been given “broad-autonomy” which if, true shatters the assertion that ISI is in the control of the army and is allowed “freelance missions”. In another disturbing account reported is how CIA’s deputy director, Stephen R.Kappes confronts Pakistanis officials with evidence that the ISI helped planned a deadly suicide bombing on India’s Embassy in Kabul in July, 2008 or how in August, 2008 an ISI presumably “gone-rouge” colonel plotted to assassinate President Hamid Karzai? news which could potentially disturb Pakistan’s new-found relationship with Hamid Karzai who had recently emerged as Pakistan’s staunch ally in Kabul.

Another aspect of the WikiLeaks is how PAKMIL (a word used to describe the Pakistani Army) helps the Taliban destabilize ISAF/NATO in Afghanistan: describing the networks of Pakistani assets and collaborators that run from the Pakistani tribal belt along the Afghan border, through southern Afghanistan and all the way to the capital, Kabul.

And finally the view and damaging details which could in point of fact leads to an arrest of Pakistan’s former top spy-master and general Hameed Gul who after almost two decades of retirement from the ISI, “don’t seem to be out of work”. WikiLeaks documents in detail indicate and confirms that Hameed Gul still works tirelessly with Haqqanis and Hekmatyar to destabilize Afghanistan and in some cases given an impression that Hameed Gul acts as a “front man” and a “proxy” for the ISI. The amazing leaks gives out a detailed example where Hameed Gul met with Afghan Talibans and “three older Arab men” (presumably Al Qaeda) to plan and avenge the death of “Zamarai” an important Al-Queda leader who was killed by a drone attack. In another report, our wily ol’Gen Gul urged, Taliban commanders, “to focus their operations inside Afghanistan in exchange for Pakistan turning a “a blind eye” to their presence in Pakistan’s tribal areas. Well, the ever-dismissive Gen Gul dismissed the report terming it as, “another conspiracy” and “absolute non-sense”. An interior ministry source failed to comment on Hameed Gul but confirmed “a proper investigation would take place” – another, source from an intelligence agency confirmed that Hameed Gul had, “always been on our radar” and is known to make “random trips and communications to the tribal areas”.

All in all, if WikiLeaks are to be believed (and their reputation is reliable), Pakistan has a lot of cleaning to do. However, what one must realize that the whole, time-frame of the 90,000+ leaks was between 2004-2009 before the whole Af-Pak Policy was laid down by the new administration in the White House and prior to the US-PAK Strategic dialogues in which Gen.Ashfaq Keyani himself gave out a long presentation winning many admirers within the US administration. However, although the new WikiLeaks fiasco is embarrassing for both the United States and Pakistan as it reflects the “mistrust” between one of the two closest allies in the War on Terror – what one must do from now is realize that without each other we cannot win this war and where the Pakistani Military needs to come clean on folks like Hameed Gul; the United States has to realize Pakistan has legitimate concerns in Afghanistan and try to stop such embarrassing leaks.
=====

(Mr. Ali Chisti is a political and counter-terrorism expert who can be reached at akchishti@hotmail.com)

Jul 9, 2010

Petraeus to Review Mc's inane ROE's


Petraeus reviews directive meant to limit Afghan civilian deaths

By Rajiv Chandrasekaran
Washington Post Staff Writer
Friday, July 9, 2010; A01

To the U.S. soldiers getting pounded with thunderous mortar rounds in their combat outpost near Kandahar, it seemed like a legitimate request: allow them to launch retaliatory mortar shells or summon an airstrike against their attackers. The incoming fire was landing perilously close to a guard station, and the soldiers, using a high-powered camera, could clearly see the insurgents shooting.

The response from headquarters -- more than 20 miles away -- was terse. Permission denied. Battalion-level officers deemed the insurgents too close to a cluster of mud-brick houses, perhaps with civilians inside.

Although the insurgents stopped firing before anybody was wounded, the troops were left seething.

"This is not how you fight a war, at least not in Kandahar," said a soldier at the outpost who described the incident, which occurred last month, on the condition of anonymity. "We've been handcuffed by our chain of command."

With insurgent attacks increasing across Afghanistan, frustration about rules of engagement is growing among troops, and among some members of Congress. Addressing those concerns will be one of the most complicated initial tasks facing Gen. David H. Petraeus, the new commander of U.S. and NATO forces in the country.

The controversy pits the desire of top military officers to limit civilian casualties, something they regard as an essential part of the overall counterinsurgency campaign, against a widespread feeling among rank-and-file troops that restrictions on air and mortar strikes are placing them at unnecessary risk and allowing Taliban fighters to operate with impunity.

During his confirmation hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Petraeus promised to "look very hard" at the rules of engagement. He has since asked Lt. Gen. David M. Rodriguez, the top operational commander in Afghanistan, to review the rules. The examination will include discussions with troops around the country, military officials said.

At issue is a tactical directive issued last July by Petraeus's predecessor, Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, that limits the use of air and mortar strikes against houses unless personnel are in imminent danger. The directive requires troops to take extensive measures, including a 48-hour "pattern of life" analysis with on-the-ground or aerial surveillance, to ensure that civilians are not in a housing compound before ordering an airstrike.

Senior U.S. military officials in Afghanistan and Washington said Petraeus almost certainly will not rescind the directive but instead will issue revised guidance in the coming days in an attempt to streamline procedures and ensure uniformity in how the rules are implemented.

Despite claims from some relatives of military personnel killed in Afghanistan that the directive has limited the ability of troops to defend themselves, the officials said a review by the U.S. military of every combat fatality over the past year has found no evidence that the rules restricted the use of lifesaving firepower.

"We have not found a single situation where a soldier has lost his life because he was not allowed to protect himself," one of the officials said.

If troops are in imminent danger, there is no restriction on the use of airstrikes or mortars. "The rules of engagement provide an absolute right of self-defense," the official said.

The official, like others quoted for this article, spoke on the condition of anonymity because military regulations limit discussion of rules of engagement.

Differing interpretations

Part of the controversy is rooted in divergent interpretations of the directive. To those atop the chain of command, the restriction has helped reduce civilian casualties, which have been a politically charged issue in Afghanistan and have helped sap popular support for the international military presence. There have been 197 civilian fatalities caused by NATO forces, including U.S. troops, in the 12 months since the directive was issued, compared with 332 in the previous year, according to figures compiled by the NATO command in Kabul.

Although the directive has markedly reduced the bombing of housing compounds, dozens of Afghans continue to die each year in airstrikes on other types of targets, including vehicles.

For troops on the ground, however, the directive has lowered their morale and limited their ability to pursue insurgents. They note that Taliban fighters seem to understand the new rules and have taken to sniping at troops from inside homes or retreating inside houses after staging attacks.

"Minimizing civilian casualties is a fine goal, but should it be the be-all and end-all of the policy?" said a junior Army officer in southern Afghanistan. "If we allow soldiers to die in Afghanistan at the hands of a leader who says, 'We're going to protect civilians rather than soldiers,' what's going to happen on the ground? The soldiers are not going to execute the mission to the best of their ability. They won't put their hearts into the mission. That's the kind of atmosphere we're building."

The principal problem, senior officials say, is that U.S. and allied units across Afghanistan have carried out the directive in ways that are more restrictive than McChrystal intended. Fearful of career-ending sanctions if they violate the order, commanders at every subordinate level down the chain have tightened the rules themselves, often adding their own stipulations to the use of air and mortar strikes.

This spring, the Army brigade to which the soldiers at the outpost near Kandahar belong rescinded authority from on-the-scene commanders to fire mortars or call for air support, except in the most urgent cases of self-defense. Permission now has to be granted by a battalion headquarters -- a requirement not enumerated in the tactical directive that could delay any strike on an enemy.

"Now you have to think like a lawyer when you're getting shot at," the soldier at the outpost said. "It's a case of hesitancy and oversimplification. When you're getting shot at, you don't have a lot of time to build a picture for the guys back at headquarters. Your head is in the ground."

Less than six hours before Marines commenced a major helicopter-borne assault in the town of Marja in February, Rodriguez's headquarters issued an order requiring that his operations center clear any airstrike that was on a housing compound in the area but not sought in self-defense. But before the order was given to the Marines, the British-run regional headquarters in southern Afghanistan amended the language to include any strikes "near" houses, according to two U.S. sources familiar with the incident.

The angst over the directive on airstrikes has been compounded by additional orders on driving -- be polite and don't hog the road -- and escalation-of-force situations, such as when suspicious vehicles approach convoys or entrances to bases. The rules, titled Standard Operating Procedures 373, call for military personnel to "use force for the duration and to the extent required to meet the threat and defeat or neutralize it, but no more." Some soldiers say those orders have also been used in a more draconian and patchwork way than senior commanders intended.

"We have to be absolutely certain that the implementation of the tactical directive and the rules of engagement is even throughout the force, that there are not leaders at certain levels that are perhaps making this more bureaucratic or more restrictive than necessary," Petraeus said at his confirmation hearing.

Permission denied

The tightened rules on airstrikes during the initial days of the Marja operation prompted intense frustration not just among Marines on the ground but for mid-level officers in the combat operations center at their headquarters at Camp Leatherneck.

Within an hour after the first Marines landed in Marja, officers in the command center were watching a live black-and-white video feed from an aerial drone that showed suspicious activity around a cluster of 50-gallon fuel drums within the open courtyard of a house. Marines on the ground also had intelligence that insurgents intended to target approaching U.S. forces with 50-gallon drums filled with homemade explosives and metal fragments.

But when officers at the command asked for permission to strike from the regional command in Kandahar, they were rejected. Too close to the house, they were told.

The Marines proposed targeting the drums at an angle to avoid damaging the house in case, as one officer noted, "they contained baby milk." Again they were denied.

Finally, as the sun rose, a Marine unit began approaching the compound. The frustrated officer, fearful that a detonation would kill the troops, declared the target a case of self-defense. No longer was he required to seek permission.

Three Hellfire missiles were launched at the drums, igniting them into a huge fireball, indicating that they were filled with explosives.

"You can't fight a war like this," the officer growled.

Feb 28, 2010

Sucess In Marjah...Now it's "Hold & Build"


Normalcy Takes Root In Marja After Allied Offensive
A bazaar has come back to life and residents are returning home. But if the U.S.-led fight against insurgents is over in Marja, the battle to win the support of locals has just begun.

Los Angeles Times
By Tony Perry

Reporting from Marja, Afghanistan--Just a few dozen yards from the bullet-riddled government building, Marine Brig. Gen. Larry Nicholson found more proof Saturday that the battle for Marja was over.

"A popcorn vendor on the streets of Marja," Nicholson said in a gleeful voice as he found some coins in his pocket and bought a bag of freshly popped corn.

"None of those tourist prices now," Nicholson joked as the vendor, understanding not a word of English, nodded in agreement.

Two weeks ago, the same government building was the hub of fighting as Marines and Afghan soldiers battled Taliban insurgents who held sway in this town in southern Afghanistan. Residents hid in their homes; businesses were shuttered, fields were untended. Thousands fled.

Now popcorn is being sold, an adjacent bazaar has come back to life, and the main road into Marja was packed with vehicles bringing residents back to their homes and farms on Saturday, the fifth consecutive day with no battles.

The insurgents have either been killed, are in hiding or have fled to other areas of Helmand province, which have seen an increase in the number of U.S. and North Atlantic Treaty Organization military personnel killed in recent days.

Eight Marines, two Afghan soldiers and an Afghan police officer were killed in the battle of Marja. No official tally of Taliban dead has been kept; the number is thought to be in the hundreds.

But if the fighting has ended, the battle to win the support of Marja residents has only begun. Time is crucial.

"We have only a small window," said Col. Burke Whitman, the Marines' liaison to the Afghan police and army.

In the years before the Taliban reign in Marja, the city's government and particularly its police force had a reputation for corruption and brutality. U.S. officials say that made it easier for the residents to accept rule by the Taliban, which had its own cruel streak.

As an initial step in the reconstruction plan, a cadre of police officers from outside Marja has been put in place while a permanent police force is in training. That formula has worked well in other Helmand communities. No former Marja police officers are being allowed to return to the force.

"What we can't do is bring back in the same government or police," Nicholson said. "The people of Marja need a fresh start."

A district governor, Haji Abdul Zahir, has been called back from self-imposed exile. On Saturday, he met Nicholson and a group that included Marine Gen. James Mattis and American novelist Steven Pressfield (author of "The Afghan Campaign," a fictional account of the battles of Alexander the Great).

"The Taliban did nothing for Marja; we will bring back dignity and prosperity," said Zahir, repeating a line he used Thursday when the Afghan flag was unfurled above a temporary government center.

Although Marja is called a city, it could be more accurately described as a network of impoverished villages connected by rutted, trash-strewn roads. Homes are made of mud, many with mud walls encircling the property.

Each village has its own bazaar, with stalls and straw roofs. Fifty-five businesses had reopened by late in the week, selling fruit and vegetables, motorbike parts, clothing, pharmaceuticals and more.

The recent rains have left the fields green and lush. Farming, including crops of poppies that are used to make heroin, is the dominant industry here, helped by irrigation canals built by the U.S. government in the 1950s.

A plan has already been cobbled together to offer wheat seeds and fertilizer to farmers in an attempt to persuade them to stop growing poppies.

Beyond its symbolic value as a place where a U.S. and Afghan force wrested control from the Taliban, Marja and its surrounding fields are thought to be key to the insurgency's finances, providing profits from the heroin trade to hire recruits and buy weaponry and the makings of roadside bombs.

Three Marja residents, including a former police official, have been identified as potential leaders in a campaign to undercut reconstruction efforts, possibly because of their links to the heroin trade. Marja police will be watching their moves.

A group of U.S., British and Danish reconstruction specialists has devised a multimillion-dollar plan for Marja that includes reopening schools and health clinics, installing solar lighting in the bazaars, repairing culverts and streets, and offering cleanup jobs for the many unemployed, who are sometimes recruited by the Taliban. The three governments are contributing money.

Later on, the plan calls for building police stations and small hydroelectric pumps and offering microloans to farmers and merchants.

So-called stabilization specialists from the U.S. and Britain have already set up a tent at the government building, where many of the Marines who were in the thick of the fighting are stationed. The specialists' first goal is to talk to village elders about their needs and to convince them that the provincial government is on their side.

As Nicholson and Mattis, who is commander of the U.S. Joint Forces Command, met with Afghan leaders, soldiers, police and Marja residents, the emphasis Saturday was on remembering those killed in the battle.

"I'm sorry for the Marines you lost," Zahir said. "We will pray for them."

Feb 26, 2010

Keep 'Don't Ask-Don't Tell' - CMC


Marine Corps Leader Stands Against Gays In Military
Gen. James T. Conway tells the Senate Armed Services Committee that he thinks 'don't ask, don't tell' works as it is.

By Julian E. Barnes
Los Angeles Times
February 26, 2010

Reporting from Washington--The commandant of the Marine Corps said Thursday that gays should not be allowed to serve openly in the military, becoming the most senior commander to break from President Obama's goal of lifting the ban.

Gen. James T. Conway, testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee, said the policy known as "don't ask, don't tell" should be left alone.

"I think the current policy works," he said. "My best military advice to this committee, to the secretary, to the president, would be to keep the law such as it is."

Conway's stance is considered crucial because it shows there are sharp disagreements among top officers and within the Joint Chiefs of Staff about whether to allow gays and lesbians to serve openly. Opposition from military leaders helped derail earlier efforts to lift the ban, most notably former President Clinton's effort in 1993.

Unlike previous attempts to ease rules, however, top Pentagon officials have endorsed a change. Adm. Michael G. Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, said this month that he wanted a new policy and that allowing gays to serve openly was a matter of "integrity."

Republicans opposed to changing the policy have said that Mullen's views do not represent those of other senior military leaders.

The chiefs of the various military services have been testifying before the House and Senate this week, and lawmakers have questioned them about the Obama administration's plans to overturn the 1993 law that bars gays and lesbians from serving openly. Since the law was passed, about 14,000 service members have been removed from the military because of their sexual orientation.

During their testimony, none of the chiefs backed Mullen's position by calling for an end to the ban. But all of the chiefs, including Conway, have supported Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates' plan to study the effect of changing of the law.

Conway has taken positions at odds with top Pentagon officials in the past, but has not publicly addressed the issue of gays in the military. Conway is due to retire this summer when his term as commandant is up.

He told lawmakers that any policy change should not be judged by its fairness to gays, but by its impact on the military.

"My personal opinion is that unless we can strip away the emotion, agenda and politics and ask [whether] we somehow enhance the war-fighting of the United States Marine Corps by allowing homosexuals to openly serve, then we haven't addressed it from the correct perspective," Conway said. Conway was challenged, gently, by Sen. Joe Lieberman (I-Conn.), who has said that he plans to introduce legislation to allow gays to serve openly.

"I hope we conclude that repealing 'don't ask don't tell' will enhance military readiness," Lieberman said.

Some advocacy groups were more direct.

Aubrey Sarvis, executive director of the Servicemembers Legal Defense Network, said that any law that pushed out qualified troops during wartime undermined military readiness and effectiveness.

"Gen. Conway was the only chief to say to Congress this week that the law is 'working,' " Sarvis said. "It is not working."

Jan 18, 2010

Karzai To Attempt a Reconciliation Plan


Karzai Closing In On Taliban Reconciliation PlanBy Rod Nordland and Alissa J. Rubin
New York Times
January 18, 2010

KABUL, Afghanistan — The Afghan government will soon unveil a major new plan offering jobs, security, education and other social benefits to Taliban followers who defect, according to the spokesman for President Hamid Karzai.

The plan, in the final stages of preparation, will go beyond the government’s previous offers to the Taliban, Waheed Omer, the spokesman, said at a news conference on Sunday. “The mistakes we have committed before have been considered in developing this new plan,” he said. “We have not done enough.”

The reconciliation and reintegration plan is aimed at luring large numbers of the Taliban’s followers, estimated by NATO officials at 25,000 to 30,000 active fighters, to change sides, and has qualified support from American officials. Afghan officials are hoping to finance the plan through pledges from the international community to be made at a London conference on Afghanistan planned for Jan. 28.

Even if such a plan wins international support, serious questions remain about Afghanistan’s ability to carry it out, especially without a functioning national government, a prospect that remained distant on Sunday.

Parliament turned down more than half of Mr. Karzai’s second list of nominees for cabinet ministers on Saturday. On Sunday, Mr. Omer said it was unlikely that Mr. Karzai would be able to complete his cabinet before the London conference, leaving important ministries leaderless.

Richard C. Holbrooke, the American special envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan, said that he had discussed the plan with Mr. Karzai and that it was better than previous efforts, adding, “Can’t be worse.”

Mr. Karzai has previously promised amnesty to Taliban fighters willing to lay down their weapons and has offered repeatedly to talk directly with the Taliban leader Mullah Omar, but with little effect.

A relatively small number of Taliban have defected; some 170 came over to the government in late 2009, according to the United Nations.

Chief among the new measures, Mr. Omer said, were strong security guarantees to defecting Taliban that they would be protected from arrest or retaliation. He did not detail what those measures would be, but many defecting Taliban in the past have asked to be integrated into local police forces.

Mr. Omer also indirectly confirmed that the Afghan government might ask that Mullah Omar be removed from the United Nations terrorist blacklist, which freezes the bank accounts of those listed and bans them from international travel.

A private Afghan TV channel, Tolo TV, quoted Mr. Omer as saying that Mullah Omar’s name would “probably” be considered for removal from the blacklist. But on Sunday, Mr. Omer said that it was premature to talk about such details and that the blacklist would not be discussed in London.

American officials have been skeptical about engaging with Taliban leaders who may have close associations with Al Qaeda, and Mr. Holbrooke directly ruled out removing Mullah Omar’s name from the blacklist. “I can’t imagine what would justify such an action,” he said at a media gathering on Sunday.

Although the full details of the government’s plan are not yet clear, some experts have put the cost of carrying it out at $1 billion, mainly for jobs and education programs aimed at reintegrating former guerrillas.

A top adviser to Mr. Karzai, Mohammed Masoom Stanekzai, who helped draft the plan, suggested that number was on target. “If we can spend billions of dollars on military operations and security,” he said in a telephone interview on Sunday, “I think it is worth spending a billion dollars to build peace.”

He cautioned that any plan would have to take into account joblessness among Afghans who had not joined the Taliban, so they would not feel that insurgents were unfairly rewarded while their own loyalty was not.

Mr. Stanekzai did not rule out the possibility of talking with Mr. Omar. “What we need is a top-down and bottom-up approach,” he said.

The presence of some Taliban leaders on the United Nations blacklist was a negative “psychological force” preventing reconciliation talks, he said.

“The people in Afghanistan are tired of fighting and war, and there is a new political will in the region and also in the international community to reconcile with those who are not linked with Al Qaeda,” he said. He said that Mr. Karzai would announce details of the plan in “a couple more days.”

Mr. Holbrooke said he was encouraged by what he called “unambiguous national support for reintegration” of the Taliban’s followers.

“This is not going to end by killing everyone who fights with the Taliban,” Mr. Holbrooke said. What was lacking previously, he said, was “a vehicle for them to come in from the cold.” Without that, he said, “you give people no choice but to kill or be killed.”

“Stanekzai has a good plan, ISAF command has a good plan,” Mr. Holbrooke said, referring to the American-led NATO force in Afghanistan, the International Security Assistance Force.

The NATO force’s top spokesman, Rear Adm. Gregory J. Smith of the United States Navy, did not lay out the details of a separate plan, but said Saturday, “We are working closely with the government of Afghanistan as they develop their program.”

Admiral Smith said the program appeared to be “one of the means to resolve the ongoing insurgency.” He said coalition troops would not be involved in reconciliation efforts such as talks with Taliban leaders, “although we would support the government of Afghanistan’s efforts in this area.”

Mr. Omer’s remarks suggested that the government had a softer line than the Americans on talking to Taliban leaders. “We are ready to negotiate with anyone,” he said. “Whoever comes over is welcome.”

A spokesman for the Taliban in southern Afghanistan, Qari Yousuf Ahmadi, ruled out any possibility of negotiations with Mr. Karzai’s government. “We are united and we will remain united against them,” Mr. Ahmadi said in a telephone interview. “There is no differentiation between Taliban moderates and extremists. We are fighting under one name, Taliban, under one leadership.”

Nov 24, 2009

Obama: I'll Finish the Job


Obama Promises to 'Finish the Job' in Afghanistan
By THE ASSOCIATED PRESS
Tues, 12:58 p.m. ET

WASHINGTON (AP) -- Signaling an imminent decision on Afghanistan troop levels, President Barack Obama said Tuesday he intends to ''finish the job'' and destroy terrorist networks in the region.

The president said he would announce his decision on how many additional soldiers to deploy to Afghanistan after Thanksgiving.

''I feel confident that when the American people hear a clear rationale for what we're doing there and how we intend to achieve our goals, that they will be supportive,'' he said.

Obama held his 10th and final war council meeting Monday night to assess his Afghanistan strategy in advance of his troop decision. He commented Tuesday during a brief news conference with Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, who was at the White House for a state visit.

''It is in our strategic interests, in our national security interest to make sure that al-Qaida and its extremist allies cannot operate effectively in those areas,'' Obama said. ''We are going to dismantle and degrade their capabilities and ultimately dismantle and de stroy their networks.''

''It is my intention to finish the job,'' he said of the war in Afghanistan that has been going on for eight years -- since the Sept. 11 attacks in 2001.

Sep 27, 2009

Insurgents know what they want

McChrystal Says Insurgents Are Winning Communications Battle

By Walter Pincus, Washington Post
September 27, 2009

The United States and its allies in Afghanistan must "wrest the information initiative" from the Taliban and other insurgent groups that have undermined the credibility of the Kabul government and its international backers, according to the top U.S. and NATO commander in the country.

"The information domain is a battlespace," Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal wrote in an assessment made public on Monday, adding that the allies need to "take aggressive actions to win the important battle of perception."

((It's simple: the Taliban focuses on Islam vs. the West; we focus on logistics of meals served and kilowatt hours. We don't have a message as to why we're in A'stan - they do. AJL ))
As an initial step, McChrystal wants to change the goal of public relations efforts in Afghanistan from a "struggle for the 'hearts and minds' of the Afghan population to one of giving them 'trust and confidence' " in themselves and their government. At the same time, he said, more effort should be made to "discredit and diminish insurgents and their extremist allies' capability to influence attitudes and behavior in Afghanistan."

One way to accomplish that, McChrystal wrote, is to target insurgent networks "to disrupt and degrade" their effectiveness. Another is to expose what he calls the insurgents' "flagrant contravention of the principles of the Koran," including indiscriminate use of violence and terrorism, and! attacks on schools and development projects.

McChrystal's appro ach mirrors one that U.S. intelligence operatives are taking covertly, with some success, in the Middle East, where direct and indirect support is being given to Islamic leaders who speak out against terrorists. Michael E. Leiter, director of the National Counterterrorism Center, said last year that the goal is to show "that it is al-Qaeda, not the West, that is truly at war with Islam."

Echoing that idea, McChrystal recognized in his report that Afghans traditionally communicate by word of mouth. He called for better exploitation of those "more orthodox methods" -- getting "authoritative figures" such as religious leaders and tribal elders to deliver the messages "so that they are credible."

One of the main changes from the current approach should be creating "opportunities for Afghans to communicate as opposed to attempting to always control the message," McChrystal wrote.

Another element he wants changed is the military's public responsiveness to incidents involving U.S. or allied forces that result in Afghan civilian deaths. Overreliance on firepower that kills civilians and destroys homes "severely damaged" the coalition's legitimacy in the eyes of Afghans, he noted, saying the Taliban publicized such incidents.

New procedures must be developed for sharing information about such events, he wrote, so that when they happen, "we are first with the truth."

McChrystal's recommended expansion of the Afghan strategic communications program followed public calls for such a step by the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Adm. Mike Mullen, and by Richard C. Holbrooke, the U.S. special envoy to the region. Holbrooke has repeatedly complained that the Taliban has communicated more effectively than the United States, and he told a House subcommittee in June that there was a need to refine the coalition's message and use new ways to reach Afghans, suggesting cellphones, radio and other means.

Mullen, in a recent issue of Joint Force Quarterly, emphasized that the problem with commun icating with people rested on "policy and execution." He added, "To put it simply, we need to worry a lot less about how to communicate our actions and much more about what our actions communicate."

McChrystal wants new emphasis put on improving the Afghan government's capacity in the information field, including better partnerships with the spokesmen of the Defense and Interior ministries. A proposed contract for 275 contractors to work in the Defense Ministry says two are to be assigned to the public affairs office to develop an "effective" media relations program.

McChrystal also called in his assessment for the coalition to develop its own print, radio and television systems, and to take steps to "partner more effectively with the Afghan commercial sector."

In addition, McChrystal lists as a goal making public relations efforts beyond Afghanistan more effective. There has already been a step-up in press material sent to U.S. journalists. On Friday, seven releases were sent to The Washington Post, including one with four photos. The caption of one photo reads: "An Afghan commando team advances toward practice targets at a Kandahar training facility Sept. 24. Afghan National Army and police training is overseen by ISAF military mentors, with a goal that the Afghans will one day independently foster peace and stability in Afghanistan."

Congress, however, has expressed concern about the rapid growth of the military's involvement in an area once under the purview of the State Department. In July, the House Appropriations Committee, in approving the fiscal 2010 defense funding bill, said it had identified 10 strategic communications programs that boosted costs from $9 million in fiscal 2005 to a "staggering $988 million request for fiscal 2010." The committee said many of the costlier programs appear as "alarmingly non-military propaganda, public relations, and behavioral modification messaging."

In Iraq, the U.S. m! ilitary spent more than $500 million over six years developing a publi c relations campaign run mainly by American contractors. Starting with nearly $100 million for a U.S. contractor to run the newspaper, radio and television networks owned by one of Saddam Hussein's sons, the strategic communications program was expanded to include billboards, pamphlets, radio and TV spots, and programs to place articles in Iraqi newspapers and magazines.

In June, The Post's Ernesto Londono reported from Baghdad that the multimillion-dollar campaign ultimately did not help burnish the U.S. military's image, marginalize extremists, promote democracy or foster reconciliation.

By way of example, Londono quoted Ziyad al-Aajeely, director of Iraq's nonprofit Journalistic Freedom Observatory, as saying while he flipped through an issue of the U.S.-subsidized newspaper Baghdad Now: "The millions spent on this is wasted money. Nobody reads this."

Sep 15, 2009

ArmorGroup to be ousted? Is paid $ 189 mill, yet hires TCN's and shorts troops on ammo

Official Says Contractor in Kabul May Be Ousted

By GINGER THOMPSON
New York Times
September 15, 2009

WASHINGTON — The State Department official responsible for overseeing private contracts said Monday that the government was seriously considering terminating its $189 million arrangement with ArmorGroup North America because of recent disclosures of misbehavior by guards at the United States Embassy in Afghanistan.

At a hearing before a federal commission investigating wartime spending, Patrick F. Kennedy, the under secretary of state for management, said ArmorGroup managers had failed to notify the government about parties in which drunken, half-naked guards had urinated on and groped one another.

In response to commission members’ demands that the company be held accountable, Mr. Kennedy said, “We are seeing a very, very serious case being made for termination.”

Mr. Kennedy spoke at a hearing of the independent Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan that was scheduled after a nonprofit oversight group released photographs two weeks ago of the ArmorGroup bacchanals. Those photos led to a State Department investigation and the firing of several ArmorGroup managers.

“It’s a no-brainer — that conduct was appalling,” Mr. Kennedy said. “And the failure on the part of the ArmorGroup managers to stop it caused us to ask for their removal.”

But several other witnesses and almost all eight members of the commission contended that the State Department was doing too little too late about a contract long plagued with serious problems. Among other things, the ArmorGroup force, which provides security at the United States Embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan, was short on ammunition and understaffed, and its guards did not speak enough English to follow simple commands.

A trail of correspondence between the State Department and ArmorGroup, dating back to 2007, showed that the government was aware of the problems and warned ArmorGroup that it could lose its contract. But the State Department repeatedly accepted ArmorGroup’s promises that problems would be fixed and opted to extend the arrangement.

This time, the commission members said, ArmorGroup must go. Dov S. Zakheim, a former under secretary of defense, said the photos from the ArmorGroup parties posed as much of a threat to American interests in Afghanistan as the photos of abuses at Abu Ghraib posed in Iraq.

“We need to get rid of these people, and we need to do it now, because these pictures on the Internet are killing us,” Mr. Zakheim said. “Afghans go home and tell this stuff to their relatives, who tell it to their tribes, who tell it to the Taliban, who are going to shoot our kids.”

Samuel Brinkley, an executive at Wackenhut Services Inc., a subsidiary of G4S, the Danish company that owns ArmorGroup, said he was “personally embarrassed” by the company’s misconduct in Afghanistan.

He acknowledged that the company did not notify the State Department about the accusations of drinking and sexual harassment until two weeks after learning about them, a delay he characterized as wrong.

But he said the company was determined to make things right by, among other things, replacing the entire management team in Kabul and adopting a policy of no alcohol at Camp Sullivan, the base where its civilian guards are housed.

“We have no tolerance for the types of behaviors that have come to light in Kabul,” Mr. Brinkley said. “We take all allegations seriously. We investigate them. We take firm, swift action to remedy the situation.”

Aug 20, 2009

The Air Force is Upset ? Truth Hurts!


A "mindless shot?" Read Gen Petraeus's remarks below. HOOAH!!

Beyond Outrageous
CENTCOM Boss Takes Mindless Shot at USAF

Airforce-magazine.com
August 19, 2009

"Joking" comments of Army Gen. David Petraeus, the commander of US Central Command, during his presentation at the Marine Corps Association Foundation dinner on July 30 belittled the contributions of the Air Force to the joint force.

In his prepared remarks, Petraeus said: "Then, of course, 25,000 feet above them [soldiers and marines], an Air Force pilot flips aside his ponytail and looks down at them through his cockpit as he flies over. 'Boy,' he radios his wingman, 'It must be tough down there.' "

We reviewed the video to get his actual remarks and found he embellished his "joke," changing the altitude to 30,000 feet and saying, "… an Air Force pilot flips aside his ponytail—I don't know how that got in there; I know they haven't had ponytails in a year or two—and looks down … ."

Petraeus, as leader of CENTCOM, the joint force charged with running operations in Southwest Asia, should have known better than to make such disparaging remarks, even in jest. Certainly, his handlers at CENTCOM finally realized the effect they would have—they excised that part of his remarks from the version on the CENTCOM Web site. (We found the original version—along with the video—still posted on August 19 at the Marine Corps Association Web site.)

In all fairness, early in his actual remarks, Petraeus did offer this joint praise, saying, "The best examples of true importance have been found in our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines who have deployed in harm's way."

However, those words do not alleviate the offensiveness—and un-jointness—of his later comments. They are symptomatic of the long-held belief of many ground commanders that airpower is no longer, if it ever was, relevant. (Read Fraudulent Flak from the September 2000 Air Force Magazine.)

Here's the entire section from Petraeus' remarks with the "joke" as given at the dinner:

"Come to think of it, in fact another bedrock element of the Marine Corps is unquestionably having the best recruiting ads on television. [Laughter] But this concept is not just an advertisement. The Marines' sense of toughness permeates the Corps' lore as well as its reality. To recall an illustrative story, a soldier is trudging through the muck in the midst of a downpour with a 60-pound rucksack on his back. This is tough, he thinks to himself. Just ahead of him trudges an Army ranger with an 80-pound pack on his back. This is really tough, he thinks. And ahead of him is a Marine with a 90-pound pack on, and he thinks to himself, I love how tough this is. [laughter, applause] Then, of course, 30,000 feet above them, [laughter] 30,000 feet above them an Air Force pilot flips aside his ponytail. [laughter, applause] Now — I'm sorry. I don't know how that got in there,[laughter]I know they haven't had ponytails in a year or two[laughter] and looks down at them through his cockpit as he flies over. "Boy", he radios his wingman, "it must be tough down there." [laughter] Well, TV commercials and all joking aside, we've all seen that Marines truly and consistently live up to their reputation."

Jul 31, 2009

More Troops to Afghanistan


In Afghanistan, U.S. May Shift Strategy
Request for Big Boost in Afghan Troops Could Also Require More Americans

By Rajiv Chandrasekaran
Washington Post
July 31, 2009

The top U.S. commander in Afghanistan is preparing a new strategy that calls for major changes in the way U.S. and other NATO troops there operate, a vast increas! e in the size of Afghan security forces and an intensified military effort to root out corruption among local government officials, according to several people familiar with the contents of an assessment report that outlines his approach to the war.

Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, who took charge of U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan last month, appears inclined to request an increase in American troops to implement the new strategy, which aims to use more unconventional methods to combat the growing Taliban insurgency, according to members of an advisory group he convened to work on the assessment. Such a request could receive a chilly reception at the White House, where some members of President Obama's national security team have expressed reluctance about authorizing any more deployments.

Senior military officials said McChrystal is waiting for a recommendation from a team of military planners in Kabul before reaching a final decision on a troop request. Severa! l members of the advisory group, who spoke about the issue of force le vels on the condition of anonymity, said that they think more U.S. troops are needed but that it was not clear how large an increase McChrystal would seek.

"There was a very broad consensus on the part of the assessment team that the effort is under-resourced and will require additional resources to get the job done," a senior military official in Kabul said.

A request for more U.S. troops in Afghanistan could pose a political challenge for Obama. Some leading congressional Democrats have voiced skepticism about sustaining current force levels, set to reach 68,000 by the fall. After approving an extra 21,000 troops in the spring, Obama himself questioned whether "piling on more and more troops" would lead to success, and his national security adviser, James L. Jones, told U.S. military commanders in Afghanistan last month that the administration wants to hold troop levels flat for now.

One senior administration official said some members of Obama's national! security team want to see how McChrystal uses the 21,000 additional troops before any more deployments are authorized. "It'll be a tough sell," the official said.

Even so, McChrystal has been instructed by his superiors -- including Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Adm. Mike Mullen -- to conduct a thorough assessment of the war effort and articulate his recommendations. While McChrystal has indicated to some of his advisers that he is leaning toward asking for more forces, he has also emphasized that his strategy will involve fundamental changes in the way those troops are used.

One of the key changes outlined in the latest drafts of the assessment report, which will be provided to Gates by mid-August, is a shift in the "operational culture" of U.S. and NATO forces. Commanders will be encouraged to increase contact with Afghans, even if it means living in less-secure outposts inside towns and spending more time on! foot patrols instead of in vehicles.

"McChrystal understands th at you don't stop IEDs [improvised explosive devices] by putting your soldiers in MRAPs," heavily armored trucks designed to withstand blasts, said Andrew Exum, a fellow at the Center for a New American Security in Washington who served on the assessment team. "You stop them by convincing the population not to plant them in the first place, and that requires getting out of trucks and interacting with people."
The report calls for intelligence resources to be realigned to focus more on tribal and social dynamics so commanders can identify local power brokers and work with them. Until recently, the vast majority of U.S. and NATO intelligence assets had been oriented toward tracking insurgents.

The changes are aimed at fulfilling McChrystal's view that the primary mission of the international forces is not to conduct raids against Taliban strongholds but to protect civilians and help the Afghan government assume responsibility for maintaining security. "The focus ha! s to be on the people," he said in a recent interview.

To accomplish that, McChrystal has indicated that he is considering moving troops out of remote mountain valleys where Taliban fighters have traditionally sought sanctuary and concentrating more forces around key population centers.

The assessment report also urges the United States and NATO to almost double the size of the Afghan security forces. It calls for expanding the Afghan army from 134,000 soldiers to about 240,000, and the police force from 92,000 personnel to about 160,000. Such an increase would require additional U.S. forces to conduct training and mentoring.

McChrystal and his top lieutenants have expressed concern about a lack of Afghan soldiers to patrol alongside foreign troops and to take responsibility for protecting pacified areas from Taliban infiltration. In Helmand province, where U.S. Marines are engaged in a major operation, fewer than 500 Afghan soldiers are available to work ! with almost 11,000 American service members.

Some U.S. and Europ ean officials involved in Afghanistan policy warn that the Afghan government does not have the means to pay for such a large army and police force, but McChrystal and his assessment team believe additional Afghan troops are essential to the country's stability. U.S. officials have said that they would like European nations to help cover the cost of training and sustaining additional Afghan forces.

The strategy advocates changes in what happens after Afghan soldiers graduate from boot camp. Instead of just placing small groups of U.S. trainers with Afghan units, the assessment calls for a top-to-bottom partnership between Afghan and NATO security forces that involves everyone from generals to privates working in tandem. "We've got to live together, we've got to train together, we've got to conduct operations together," one senior U.S. military official in Kabul said. "Everything we do has to be done together."

The assessment also calls for U.S. and NATO forces to ! be far more involved in fighting corruption and promoting effective governance, describing the risk to the overall mission from ineffective and venal government officials as being on par with the threat from top Taliban commanders. "These are co-equal ways we could lose the war," said Stephen Biddle, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations who served on the assessment team.

The team, which spent more than a dozen hours meeting with McChrystal over the past month, was made up of several prominent national security specialists from a variety of think thanks in Washington, including the American Enterprise Institute, the Brookings Institution and the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Jul 30, 2009

WSJ trashes the "Birthers"

It’s Certifiable
The last word on President Obama’s place of birth.

By JAMES TARANTO
Wall Street Journal
30 July 2009
Several readers have written over the past few days taking us to task for dismissing so-called birthers as lunatics without bothering to refute their claims. We reluctantly concede their point. The birthers have managed to sow confusion in the minds of some who are not lunatics, and for the latter group’s benefit it is worth clarifying matters.

Compounding the confusion, some rebuttals of the birthers’ claims have been based in part on misinformation. National Review, for example, asserts that it would not matter if the president had been born in a foreign country: “His mother was a native of Kansas, whose residents have been citizens of the United States for a very long time, and whose children are citizens of the United States as well.”

In fact, although some people born outside the U.S. are natural-born citizens (including John McCain, born in Panama, where his father was stationed as a naval officer), the timing and circumstances of Obama’s birth make the place a necessary condition for natural-born citizenship. The State Department Web site explains the law that would have applied if Obama were born overseas:

Birth Abroad to One Citizen and One Alien Parent in Wedlock: A child born abroad to one U.S. citizen parent and one alien parent acquires U.S. citizenship at birth under Section 301(g) INA provided the citizen parent was physically present in the U.S. for the time period required by the law applicable at the time of the child’s birth. (For birth on or after November 14, 1986, a period of five years physical presence, two after the age of fourteen is required. For birth between December 24, 1952 and November 13, 1986, a period of ten years, five after the age of fourteen are required for physical presence in the U.S. to transmit U.S. citizenship to the child.

Obama was born before 1986 to married parents, and his father was an alien. Thus if it were an overseas birth, his mother would have to have lived in the U.S. for 5 years after age 14 in order for her child to be a natural-born American. Mrs. Obama was only 18 when Barack was born, so she had not even lived 5 years after age 14.

This is something of a technicality: Someone born overseas and after 1986, but otherwise in identical circumstances to Obama, would be a natural-born citizen thanks to a law signed by President Reagan. We don’t recall any outcry back then about the threat that some such person could grow up to be president, nor, as far as we are aware, are any birthers calling for a change in this law to return to the status quo ante 1986. Even if the birthers’ conspiracy theory were true, it would be hard to square the intensity of their emotion over the subject with the practical effect of Obama’s (hypothetical) overseas birth, which would be roughly nil.

Ah, but the law is the law, the birthers will reply--and who can disagree? The birthers can. Whether out of ignorance or dishonesty, they misrepresent the law at every turn. Back in November, as we noted, the birthers were claiming that the Supreme Court had ordered Obama to “prove” his eligibility for the presidency. In fact, all that had happened was that a lawyer had asked the high court to hear an appeal of a lower court’s decision throwing out his frivolous lawsuit for lack of standing. The justices, of course, denied the petition, and all such lawsuits have been summarily dismissed for lack of standing. The law is the law.

The birthers have also misrepresented the law in the claims they have made about Obama’s birth certificate. In truth, Obama has proved that he is a native of Hawaii, and this proof would hold up in any legal or administrative proceeding.

In order to explain the birthers’ deception on this point, it is necessary to delve into the arcana of Hawaiian vital records. The document that Obama has released, which carries the title “certification of live birth,” confirms that the president was born in Honolulu. It is a legal birth certificate, and, as the Honolulu Star-Bulletin notes, it is the only kind of birth certificate the state of Hawaii issues.

FactCheck.org has a close-up photo of the certificate, which states clearly at the bottom: “This copy serves as prima facie evidence of the fact of birth in any court proceeding.” If a court were somehow to take up the question of Obama’s eligibility, then, the birth certificate would almost certainly be sufficient to resolve the question in his favor. The opposing side would have to provide serious evidence calling into question the veracity of Hawaii’s official state records. Innuendo and hearsay would not be admissible.

Further, if Congress were to pass the so-called birther bill, Obama would be able to comply easily. The bill would require presidential campaigns to submit “a copy of the candidate’s birth certificate” to the Federal Election Commission. The certificate Obama has released publicly would meet this requirement.

Ah, but what about the original birth certificate? This is the nub of the birther “case,” and this is where things get really obscure.

As the Star-Bulletin notes, Hawaiian birth certificates have changed in form since Obama was born. Back then, the official record was a paper document with the title “certificate of live birth” (rather than “certification”), and it included “more information, such as the name of hospital, certifier’s name and title; attendant’s name and title, etc.” Hawaii no longer issues those old-style birth certificates:

[Spokeswoman Janice] Okubo explained that the Health Department went paperless in 2001.

”At that time, all information for births from 1908 (on) was put into electronic files for consistent reporting,” she said. Information about births is transferred electronically from hospitals to the department.

”The electronic record of the birth is what (the Health Department) now keeps on file in order to provide same-day certified copies at our help window for most requests,” Okubo said.

CNN has reported--or rather, CNN executive Jon Klein reported to staffers in an email that others reported--that the obsolete paper certificates were destroyed when the department switched to electronic record-keeping. Klein’s information appears to have been in error. The Honolulu Advertiser reported yesterday that Okubo and her boss, Chiyome Fukino, both confirm that Obama’s original birth certificate still exists. Fukino says she has seen it and that the information matches the now-official electronic records reflected on the certificate Obama has released.

So why doesn’t Obama release the original certificate? The Advertiser says it is “unclear” whether the president “would even be allowed to see it if he asked.” It is clear, though, that the Hawaii statute governing disclosure of public records does not prohibit state officials from providing him with a copy, since he is “the registrant” and therefore has “a direct and tangible interest” in the record. One would think that Obama could persuade state officials to give him a copy, even if that is not their usual policy.

But the real question is: Why should he? The demand has no basis in principle and would have no practical benefit.

Obama has already provided a legal birth certificate demonstrating that he was born in Hawaii. No one has produced any serious evidence to the contrary. Absent such evidence, it is unreasonable to deny that Obama has met the burden of proof. We know that he was born in Honolulu as surely as we know that Bill Clinton was born in Hope, Ark., or George W. Bush in New Haven, Conn.

The release of the obsolete birth certificate would not “resolve the issue” to those for whom it is not already resolved. They claim without basis that today’s birth certificate is a fake; there is nothing to stop them from claiming without basis that yesterday’s is as well.

The president would gain nothing politically for his trouble. By acknowledging the birthers’ demands, he would lend them a modicum of credibility. By ignoring them, he actually reaps political benefits from their efforts. His critics, even those who are not birthers, end up looking like cranks by association. His supporters use the birthers to paint Obama foes as racist--which is probably unfair even to the birthers, as we argued Tuesday, but that doesn’t mean it isn’t effective.

In a Commentary article last year, William F. Buckley recounted the way he, Sen. Barry Goldwater and a handful of other top conservatives worked to stigmatize the John Birch Society, whose founder, Robert Welch, maintained, among other things, that President Eisenhower was a “dedicated, conscious agent of the Communist conspiracy,” and that the U.S. government was “under operational control of the Communist Party.” The Birchers, like the birthers, made respectable conservatives look like kooks, and in preparation for a prospective Goldwater presidential campaign, Buckley and his associates “thought it best to do a little conspiratorial organizing of their own against it.”

They succeeded in “excommunicating” the Birchers. It’s probably impossible to do the same to the birthers, because today the right wing is too vast to mount much of a conspiracy. The birthers are likely to be with us for as long as Obama is president--and because of them, it is more likely that this will be for the next 7½ rather than just 3½ years.

The Time to Leave Iraq is Now


Military memo on Iraq: Time to leave
Blunt military assessment comes despite Iraqi forces' ongoing problems
By Michael R. Gordon
The New York Times
updated 1545 EST, July 30, 2009

WASHINGTON - A senior American military adviser in Baghdad has concluded in an unusually blunt memo that the Iraqi forces suffer from deeply entrenched deficiencies but are now capable of protecting the Iraqi government, and that it is time “for the U.S. to declare victory and go home.”

Prepared by Col. Timothy R. Reese, an adviser to the Iraqi military’s Baghdad command, the memorandum asserts that the Iraqi forces have an array of problems, including corruption, poor management and the inability to resist political pressure from Shiite political parties.

For all of these problems, however, Colonel Reese argues that Iraqi forces are competent enough to hold off Sunni insurgents, Shiite militias and other internal threats to the Iraqi government. Extending the American military presence in Iraq beyond 2010, he argues, will do little to improve the Iraqis’ military performance while fueling a growing resentment.

“As the old saying goes, ‘Guests, like fish, begin to smell after three days,’ ” Colonel Reese wrote. “Since the signing of the 2009 Security Agreement, we are guests in Iraq, and after six years in Iraq, we now smell bad to the Iraqi nose.”

Not the official stance of U.S. military
A spokeswoman for Gen. Ray Odierno, the senior American commander in Iraq, said that the memo did not reflect the official stance of the United States military, was not intended for a broad audience, and that some of the problems the memo referred to had been solved since its writing in early July.

Referring to the Iraq Security Forces, the memo said: “The massive partnering efforts of U.S. combat forces with I.S.F. isn’t yielding benefits commensurate with the effort and is now generating its own opposition. We should declare our intentions to withdraw all U.S. military forces from Iraq by August 2010. This would not be a strategic paradigm shift, but an acceleration of existing U.S. plans by some 15 months.”

Before deploying to Iraq, Colonel Reese served as the director of the Combat Studies Institute at Fort Leavenworth, the Army’s premier intellectual center. He was an author of an official Army history of the Iraq war — “On Point II” — that was sharply critical of the lapses in postwar planning.

Colonel Reese’s memo comes at a sensitive time in the Iraq conflict as American forces are gradually shifting to an advisory role. American combat troops moved out of Baghdad and other Iraqi cities last month, as required by the Status of Forces Agreement concluded by the United States and Iraq.

Colonel Reese’s memo lists a number of problems that have emerged since the withdrawal. They include, he wrote, a “sudden coolness” to American advisers and the “forcible takeover” of a checkpoint in the Green Zone. Iraqi units, he added, are much less willing to conduct joint operations with their American counterparts “to go after targets the U.S. considers high value.”

The Iraqi Ground Forces Command, Colonel Reese wrote, has imposed “unilateral restrictions” on American military operations that “violate the most basic aspects” of American-Iraqi agreement.

“The Iraqi legal system in the Rusafa side of Baghdad has demonstrated a recent willingness to release individuals originally detained by the U.S. for attacks on the U.S.,” he added.

The spokeswoman for General Odierno, Lt. Col. Josslyn Aberle, responded in a e-mail to questions about the memo. “The e-mail was written by Col. Timothy Reese at the beginning of July and sent to selected personnel within Multi-National Division Baghdad on our classified e-mail system,” Colonel Aberle wrote. “It was expressed to a limited audience, and not meant for wider/general distribution.

“The e-mail reflects one person’s personal view at the time we were first implementing the Security Agreement post-30 June. It does not reflect the official views of U.S. Forces in Iraq. Since that time many of the initial issues have been resolved and our partnerships with Iraqi Security Forces and G.O.I. partners now are even stronger than before 30 June.” G.O.I. is the abbreviation for Government of Iraq.

Rapid reduction in American forcesUnder the plan developed by General Odierno, the vast majority of the approximately 130,000 American forces in Iraq will remain through Iraq’s national elections, which are expected to be held next January. After the elections and the formation of a new Iraqi government, there will be rapid reduction in American forces. By the end of August 2010, the United States would have no more than 50,000 troops in Iraq, which would include six brigades whose primary role would be to advise and train Iraqi troops.

Some experts, such as Stephen Biddle, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and a former adviser to General David H. Petraeus, have argued that this timetable may be too fast given the host of remaining problems in Iraq, including differences between Kurds and Arab leaders, remaining Sunni-Shiite tensions and the possibility that the government of Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki might become more authoritarian.

“Renewed violence in Iraq is not inevitable, but it is a serious risk,” Mr. Biddle wrote in a recent paper. “A vigorous preventive strategy is clearly preferable, therefore. The most effective option for prevention is to go slow in drawing down the U.S. military presence in Iraq. Measures to maximize U.S. leverage on important Iraqi leaders — especially Maliki — can be helpful in steering Iraqis away from confrontation and violence, but U.S. leverage is a function of U.S. presence.”

During his recent appearance in Washington, Mr. Maliki also appeared to be contemplating a possible role for American forces after the December 2011 deadline for the removal of all American troops under the Status of Forces Agreement.

The Iraqi prime minister noted in an appearance at the United States Institute of Peace, a Washington-based research organization, that the Status of Forces Agreement, would “end” the American military presence in his country in 2011. “Nevertheless, if Iraqi forces required further training and further support, we shall examine this at that time based on the needs of Iraq,” he said.

During his visit to Iraq earlier this week, Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates indicated that might be a “modest acceleration” in the number of American forces that are withdrawn from Iraq this year. At the same time, Pentagon and military officials indicated that Kurdish-Arab friction remains a serious worry and that the American advisory role is still very important.

'Incapable of change'
But Colonel Reese questioned the value of an extended advisory role.

“If there ever was a window where the seeds of a professional military culture could have been implanted, it is now long past. U.S. combat forces will not be here long enough or with sufficient influence to change it,” he wrote. “The military culture of the Baathist-Soviet model under Saddam Hussein remains entrenched and will not change. The senior leadership of the I.S.F. is incapable of change in the current environment.”

Colonel Reese appears to have anonymously circulated a less colorful version of his memo on a blog dubbed “The Enchanter’s Corner.” The author is described as an active-duty Army officer serving as an adviser in Iraq who is “passionate about political issues.” Since word of the memo began to spread, the memo has been removed from the site.