Biden calls on Pakistan to step up

Biden calls on Pakistani's to step up

By Patricia Zengerle and Chris Allbritton
Reuters, 1/12/2010

ISLAMABAD — Vice President Joe Biden attempted on Wednesday to dispel what he called common anti-American misperceptions in Pakistan while urging the government to fight growing religious extremism.

Biden's comments at a news conference with Pakistani Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gilani come as the United States seeks to put further pressure on Pakistan to take on Islamist militants who have taken refuge in Pakistani border sanctuaries from where they attack Western forces in Afghanistan.

Commenting on the assassination of Punjab Governor Salman Taseer last week at the hands of his own bodyguard for supporting changes in a controversial blasphemy law, Biden said the United States was "saddened by cold-blooded murder of a decent, brave man."

"The governor was killed simply because he was a voice of tolerance and understanding," he said.

"As you know all too well ... societies that tolerate such actions end up being consumed by those actions."

Earlier, Biden called Amna Taseer, the widow of the slain governor, to express his condolences on behalf of the president and the American people.

In addition to economic, political and security crises, Pakistan is beset by a growing religious extremism among the poor and middle class, which often translates into suspicion toward the United States and the West in general.

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Militant groups have exploited grievances, exacerbated by U.S. drone attacks in the west of the country, to build support.

"We know that there are those -- I am not talking about leadership, I am talking about the public discourse -- that in America's fight against al Qaeda, we've imposed a war upon Pakistan," Biden said.

"They (al Qaeda) continue to plot attacks against the United States and our interests to this very day," he said. "They have found refuge in the most remote portions of your country."

Pakistan often denies the presence of al Qaeda leadership on its soil.

SELF-INTEREST OF BOTH

But Biden also expressed American support for Pakistan in the form of the Kerry-Lugar-Berman Law, which provides $7.5 billion in civilian aid over five years. Biden was an early sponsor of the bill when he was a senator.

"A close partnership with Pakistan and its people is in the vital self-interest of the United States of America," he said. "And ... in the vital self-interest of Pakistan as well."

The vice president arrived in Islamabad after two days in Kabul, where he said Pakistan needed to do more to help the United States in its battle against Taliban and other militants in Afghanistan as it prepares to withdraw its troops from there.

Pakistan is one of the largest non-NATO recipients of U.S. military aid -- it is expected to receive about $3 billion this year -- but ties are constantly on edge because of conflicting interests in the region.

Pakistan most pressing worry is the tentative 2011 timeline for the beginning of a U.S. troop drawdown in Afghanistan. It wants assurances that its interests in Kabul will be protected -- and Indian influence checked -- while at the same time the United States won't leave chaos for Pakistan to clean up, as happened in the early 1990s after the Soviet pull-out.

Washington's concern is that it won't be able to begin its drawdown if Pakistan continues to refuse to crack down on militant safe havens in its ethnic Pashtun border areas.

Washington has been pressing Islamabad to move against militants in the North Waziristan region as it has in other parts of the country. Pakistan's military has launched several offensives in the northwest but has said it does not have the capacity to do more.

To finish strong in Afghanistan - where's NATO??

The Way Out
New York Times
May 4, 2010

President Obama made a convincing case last December for sending an additional 30,000American troops to Afghanistan. Most of those new forces, plus 58,000 already in country, would fight the Taliban. A smaller number would mold Afghan recruits into an indigenous Army and National Police force that could in time assume responsibility for protecting their country so the Americans and NATO allies could go home.

That handoff, so central to Mr. Obama’s strategy, has little chance of succeeding unless NATO gets more military trainers on the ground. Of the 5,200 trainers the United States and its NATO allies in January agreed were needed, about only 2,700 are there. All but 300 or so are Americans.

Illiteracy, corruption and other problems are not unexpected in a country as poor and undeveloped as Afghanistan. But a disturbing Pentagon report to Congress last week acknowledged that one of the “most significant challenges” to fielding qualified Afghan security forces is a shortage of “institutional trainers.”

The training effort — like everything else about Afghanistan — was shortchanged for years under President George W. Bush. It has received more attention and resources under President Obama. In November, the United States and NATO opened a new integrated training mission. Its leader, Lt. Gen. William Caldwell IV, who previously led leadership schools and training programs at Fort Leavenworth, Kan., was a West Point classmate of Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the top American and allied commander in Afghanistan.

General Caldwell has brought a new coherence and purpose to the mission by revamping the Afghan Army leadership program and standardizing police instruction, among other innovations. And he has managed to double his number of trainers from 1,300 when he started to roughly 2,700 today. But he — more to the point, Defense Secretary Robert Gates and General McChrystal — is having a very hard time getting the rest of NATO to deliver on commitments.

NATO agreed that non-American members would provide half of the 5,200 trainers. Since December, those capitals have pledged to send only 1,000 trainers, and they have been very slow to deliver. Mr. Gates is now expected to send Americans to cover 600 of these slots for 90 days.
While the Americans are close to complement, General Caldwell also had to fight hard to secure enough troops to fill the American slots as well as management positions on his staff. For all of the talk about new missions and new thinking, there are still a lot of brass — and those who want to become brass — who don’t consider training a warrior’s job or a path to promotion. That culture needs to change.

American and NATO officials also need to look seriously at creating a standing corps of combat advisers who are trained and equipped to develop indigenous national security forces in overseas conflict zones.

The hurdles in training even a minimally effective Afghan force are daunting. There has been some progress. New initiatives like pay raises and mandatory literacy training should begin to improve professionalism and competency. None of these efforts have a chance if there are not enough NATO trainers to teach the Afghans how to defend their country.

1 MEF (Fwd) Takes over in S. Afghanistan

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

April 12, 2009

PRESS RELEASE 10-15

CAMP LEATHERNECK, Helmand province, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan –

The transfer of authority from Marine Expeditionary Brigade-Afghanistan to I Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward), officially occurred April 12 during a ceremony here.

During the ceremony, Maj. Gen. Richard Mills, commanding general of I MEF (Fwd), assumed responsibility for the task force’s area of operations from Brig. Gen. Larry Nicholson.

“Helmand province is a different place because of their efforts,” said Maj. Gen. Mills, referring to the Marines of MEB-Afghanistan. “It’s different because of the tactics and success they had on the battlefield. It’s different because of the success they had in the governance and economic area. They have truly changed the lives of the Afghan people and they have done that by paying with blood, sweat and tears required to accomplish a great tough mission.”

The guest speaker at the ceremony was Helmand provincial Governor Gulab Mangal.

“The security situation has been changed,” said Mangal. “People have new hope for a bright future. To bring security, peace in Helmand, Marines tried the best to get the trust and confidence of Afghan people. On behalf of the Afghan government and Helmand people, I would like to pay my condolences to family members in the United States for the sacrifice they suffered so, that Helmand province can have security and peace. MEB-Afghanistan will be remembered in the history of Helmand and Afghanistan.”

Karzai To Attempt a Reconciliation Plan

Karzai Closing In On Taliban Reconciliation PlanBy Rod Nordland and Alissa J. Rubin
New York Times
January 18, 2010

KABUL, Afghanistan — The Afghan government will soon unveil a major new plan offering jobs, security, education and other social benefits to Taliban followers who defect, according to the spokesman for President Hamid Karzai.

The plan, in the final stages of preparation, will go beyond the government’s previous offers to the Taliban, Waheed Omer, the spokesman, said at a news conference on Sunday. “The mistakes we have committed before have been considered in developing this new plan,” he said. “We have not done enough.”

The reconciliation and reintegration plan is aimed at luring large numbers of the Taliban’s followers, estimated by NATO officials at 25,000 to 30,000 active fighters, to change sides, and has qualified support from American officials. Afghan officials are hoping to finance the plan through pledges from the international community to be made at a London conference on Afghanistan planned for Jan. 28.

Even if such a plan wins international support, serious questions remain about Afghanistan’s ability to carry it out, especially without a functioning national government, a prospect that remained distant on Sunday.

Parliament turned down more than half of Mr. Karzai’s second list of nominees for cabinet ministers on Saturday. On Sunday, Mr. Omer said it was unlikely that Mr. Karzai would be able to complete his cabinet before the London conference, leaving important ministries leaderless.

Richard C. Holbrooke, the American special envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan, said that he had discussed the plan with Mr. Karzai and that it was better than previous efforts, adding, “Can’t be worse.”

Mr. Karzai has previously promised amnesty to Taliban fighters willing to lay down their weapons and has offered repeatedly to talk directly with the Taliban leader Mullah Omar, but with little effect.

A relatively small number of Taliban have defected; some 170 came over to the government in late 2009, according to the United Nations.

Chief among the new measures, Mr. Omer said, were strong security guarantees to defecting Taliban that they would be protected from arrest or retaliation. He did not detail what those measures would be, but many defecting Taliban in the past have asked to be integrated into local police forces.

Mr. Omer also indirectly confirmed that the Afghan government might ask that Mullah Omar be removed from the United Nations terrorist blacklist, which freezes the bank accounts of those listed and bans them from international travel.

A private Afghan TV channel, Tolo TV, quoted Mr. Omer as saying that Mullah Omar’s name would “probably” be considered for removal from the blacklist. But on Sunday, Mr. Omer said that it was premature to talk about such details and that the blacklist would not be discussed in London.

American officials have been skeptical about engaging with Taliban leaders who may have close associations with Al Qaeda, and Mr. Holbrooke directly ruled out removing Mullah Omar’s name from the blacklist. “I can’t imagine what would justify such an action,” he said at a media gathering on Sunday.

Although the full details of the government’s plan are not yet clear, some experts have put the cost of carrying it out at $1 billion, mainly for jobs and education programs aimed at reintegrating former guerrillas.

A top adviser to Mr. Karzai, Mohammed Masoom Stanekzai, who helped draft the plan, suggested that number was on target. “If we can spend billions of dollars on military operations and security,” he said in a telephone interview on Sunday, “I think it is worth spending a billion dollars to build peace.”

He cautioned that any plan would have to take into account joblessness among Afghans who had not joined the Taliban, so they would not feel that insurgents were unfairly rewarded while their own loyalty was not.

Mr. Stanekzai did not rule out the possibility of talking with Mr. Omar. “What we need is a top-down and bottom-up approach,” he said.

The presence of some Taliban leaders on the United Nations blacklist was a negative “psychological force” preventing reconciliation talks, he said.

“The people in Afghanistan are tired of fighting and war, and there is a new political will in the region and also in the international community to reconcile with those who are not linked with Al Qaeda,” he said. He said that Mr. Karzai would announce details of the plan in “a couple more days.”

Mr. Holbrooke said he was encouraged by what he called “unambiguous national support for reintegration” of the Taliban’s followers.

“This is not going to end by killing everyone who fights with the Taliban,” Mr. Holbrooke said. What was lacking previously, he said, was “a vehicle for them to come in from the cold.” Without that, he said, “you give people no choice but to kill or be killed.”

“Stanekzai has a good plan, ISAF command has a good plan,” Mr. Holbrooke said, referring to the American-led NATO force in Afghanistan, the International Security Assistance Force.

The NATO force’s top spokesman, Rear Adm. Gregory J. Smith of the United States Navy, did not lay out the details of a separate plan, but said Saturday, “We are working closely with the government of Afghanistan as they develop their program.”

Admiral Smith said the program appeared to be “one of the means to resolve the ongoing insurgency.” He said coalition troops would not be involved in reconciliation efforts such as talks with Taliban leaders, “although we would support the government of Afghanistan’s efforts in this area.”

Mr. Omer’s remarks suggested that the government had a softer line than the Americans on talking to Taliban leaders. “We are ready to negotiate with anyone,” he said. “Whoever comes over is welcome.”

A spokesman for the Taliban in southern Afghanistan, Qari Yousuf Ahmadi, ruled out any possibility of negotiations with Mr. Karzai’s government. “We are united and we will remain united against them,” Mr. Ahmadi said in a telephone interview. “There is no differentiation between Taliban moderates and extremists. We are fighting under one name, Taliban, under one leadership.”

McChrystal Says He Has What He Needs

Obama's Commander Says Now Has Tools For Afghan War
By REUTERS
Filed at 8:31 a.m. ET

WASHINGTON/KABUL (Reuters) - The top U.S. battlefield commander said on Wednesday that President Barack Obama's 30,000-strong troop increase for the Afghan war would make a huge difference, as the White House prepared to sell the new strategy to Congress.

Rising combat deaths and military costs have sapped U.S. public support for the eight-year-old war and Obama's troop increase plan has prompted protests from left-leaning leaders of his Democratic Party ahead of congressional elections next year.

Within hours of Obama's speech announcing the extra troops -- delivered as Wednesday dawned in Afghanistan -- top U.S. and NATO commander General Stanley McChrystal set off on a battlefield tour to rally his forces.

Paraphrasing Winston Churchill in a rousing speech by videophone to his commanders, McChrystal called Obama's pledge of reinforcements "the end of the beginning" of the war.

But the Taliban, in a statement issued by email, said the increase would only increase their resolve.

"This strategy by the enemy will not benefit them," it said.

McChrystal told his commanders the additional forces would at last give them the troops they need to speed up the training of Afghan security forces and protect towns and villages.

Trainin g Afghan troops was now their "main effort," he said.

"At the end of the day, the success of this operation will be determined in the minds of the Afghan people," he said.

"It's not the number of people you kill; it's the number of people you convince. It's the number of people that don't get killed. It's the number of houses that are not destroyed. It's the number of children that do get to go to school."

Asked later if he was getting enough new troops, he told reporters: "I think it is going to make a huge difference. I think we'll be in great shape."

Top Obama administration officials were due in Congress later on Wednesday where they can expect a grilling from Democrats dubious of escalating the war, and Republicans suspicious of Obama's call for an 18-month timeline to begin withdrawing.

In his televised speech on Tuesday, Obama said the goal of raising U.S. troop levels to nearly 100,000 was to step up the battle against the Taliban, secure key centers and train Afghan forces so they can take over, allowing for a U.S. withdrawal.

"We always wanted to take over the responsibility for the destiny of our nation," Afghan Defense Minister Gen. Abdul Rahim Wardak told reporters, adding that Obama's speech confirmed that the U.S. wants to help them do that.

"We just asked the international community to equip us quickly, to train us quickly, so that we can fulfill our historic responsibility."

Allies were also expected to send more soldiers, with Obama saying "the common security of the w orld" was at stake.

British Prime Minister Gordon Brown urged coalition countries to back Obama's initiative. French President Nicolas Sarkozy welcomed the plans, but did not commit France to following suit. Poland said it might send 600 troops to boost its contingent of 2,000.

SHORTER TIMELINE

There was no initial word from President Hamid Karzai, whose relations with the Obama administration are strained amid a re-election which involved widespread voter fraud.

But after meeting Karzai, McChrystal said the Afghan president backed the plan. "It was really positive. The president was very upbeat, very resolute."

Karzai is due to announce the makeup of his new government in coming days, and Washington says it is watching closely for signs he will combat corruption and appoint competent ministers.

Obama's pledge to start bringing U.S. troops home in 2011, provided conditions on the ground allow it, may help him contain rebellion among Democrats but drew swift condemnation from Republicans, who argue that setting withdrawal timelines emboldens the Taliban and undermines support for U.S.-backed governments in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Congressional committees scheduled hearings on Wednesday and Thursday to review the revised strategy, estimated to cost $30 billion this fiscal year. Obama has the authority to send the soldiers, but Congress must approve the cost.

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Defense Secretary Robert Gates and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen, are scheduled to appear before Congress.

McChrystal, who had recommended sending 40,000 troops, will testify next week.

TROOP MOVES FROM JANUARY

Major U.S. troop movements are likely to begin in January and all 30,000 should be in place by the end of August, far faster than planners had earlier suggested but in line with McChrystal's request for reinforcements before the summer fighting season.

Other NATO members are expected to commit between 5,000 and 7,000 additional troops, although some of them are already deployed as part of the alliance's 42,000-strong contingent.

Marking a major shift in U.S. strategy, McChrystal said the "vast majority" of the new combat troops would be fielded in partnership with Afghan units, a counter-insurgency mentoring tactic he said had not been fully possible in the past because the Afghan army and police were too small.

In his speech, Obama also focused on Pakistan, saying a cancer had taken root in its border region with Afghanistan and promised U.S. help to end it. Some officials in Islamabad fear the U.S. surge in Afghanistan will further destabilize their country.

ROTC for Civilian Service

ROTC for civilian service

By E.J. Dionne Jr.
Washington Post, Nov 16, 2009

Imagine a time when government work was exciting, widely admired and much sought-after.

It seems an outlandish thought at a moment when you cannot turn on your television without hearing government spoken of as almost an alien creature. It is cast as far removed from the lives of average Americans and more likely to destroy the achievements of private citizens than to accomplish anything worthwhile.

True, we don't apply our anti-government sentiments to at least one group of Americans who draw government paychecks: our men and women in uniform. All the polls show they are, deservedly, held in high esteem. But civilians who do the daily work of government are more likely to be referred to as "bureaucrats," "timeservers," and various unprintable names than as public servants.

This has not always been the American way. There were important eras in our history when citizens in large numbers were drawn to government service with a sense of mission and exhilaration. The New Deal was certainly such a time, as were the days of the New Frontier and (though it is unjustly derided now) the Great Society.

They came in part -- take note, President Obama -- because they were inspired by leaders who made it a point to call them into government. Caroline Kennedy has said that when she was growing up, "hardly a day went by when someone didn't come up to us and say: 'Your father changed my life. I went into public service because he asked me.' "

But inspiration is not enough. The military, after all, does not rely solely on patriotic feelings to build its force, and neither should the civilian parts of government. One of the most powerful incentives the military has is the Reserve Officers' Training Corps, which offers assistance to those seeking higher education. It's time for a civilian ROTC.

That's the idea of a bipartisan group of senators and House members, who are proposing to create a Roosevelt Scholars program, named after Teddy Roosevelt. Reps. David Price (D-N.C.) and Mike Castle (R-Del.) have introduced a bill in the House, and a similar measure is expected in the Senate this week from Sens. Kirsten Gillibrand (D-N.Y.) and George Voinovich (R-Ohio).

Although there is sentiment to include undergraduates in the program, the House bill is aimed at graduate students because the federal government has a special demand for highly qualified employees who are otherwise attracted (and heavily recruited) by the private sector. In exchange for generous scholarships in fields such as engineering, information technology, foreign languages and public health, the scholars would commit to three to five years of service in an agency of the federal government.

"With the aging of the boomers and those who responded to Kennedy's call to service, we need to replenish the government workforce," says Max Stier, president and chief executive of the Partnership for Public Service.

Stier, a one-man evangelizing squad on behalf of government service, notes that the government must fill 273,000 "mission-critical" positions in the next three years. This will require vast improvements in the way government recruits and a new willingness on its part to invest in its workforce.

The military, Stier says, gets roughly 40 percent of its officer corps through the ROTC. It makes sense to undertake a comparable investment in the civil service.

In the small and underappreciated world of those who care passionately about improving government's performance and prestige, there are competing visions of how to achieve this. One group of activists and legislators has been pushing to create a public service academy, modeled after the military academies, to prepare a new generation of leaders in government.

It's a good idea and would send another powerful signal that government work is and should be valued. But with the extraordinary constraints on the federal budget, the prospects of the large investment that would be required to build a new institution are not exactly rosy. A civilian ROTC would be a good first step. The Roosevelt program would have the benefit of drawing on the entire higher education system's capacity to produce specialists.

The Roosevelt program could also be an antidote to two debilitating trends in our politics. It would push back against the tendency of politicians to deride government (an odd habit, since politicians are themselves engaged in government service). And it might open the way for a bipartisan achievement at a time when such endeavors are in very short supply.

ejdionne@washpost.com

An Officer's Outrage Over Fort Hood

An Officer's Outrage Over Fort Hood
By Major Shawn Keller
November 12, 2009

As an officer in the United States Army, I'm angry for so many reasons over what happened at Ft. Hood. I'm angry that twelve of my fellow soldiers and a contractor were murdered. I'm angry that over thirty people have suffered life altering injuries from which they will never fully recover. I'm angry that the lives of so many families have been forever ruined. I'm angry that this happened on an Army post on American soil where soldiers should be safe. And I'm angry that the murderer was a terrorist who masqueraded as an Army officer for half a dozen years.

But as angry as I am at what happened, I'm even angrier that it was allowed to happen. Apparently, there was no shortage of warning signs that Hasan identified more with Islamic Jihadists than he did with the US Army. From speeches, writings, conversations, affiliations and postings on Jihadist websites, there were more than enough dots to connect that should have exposed Hasan as someone inclined to attack innocent people in the furtherance of a political, religious and ideological agenda. There were more than enough red flags raised that, at a minimum, should have gotten Hasan kicked out of the Army.

But just like September 11, those agencies and individuals charged with keeping America and Americans safe failed to connect the dots that would have saved lives. Jihadist rhetoric espoused by Hasan was categorically dismissed out of submissiveness to the concepts of tolerance and diversity. The Army as an institution has been neutered by decades of political correctness and the leaders in Hasan's chain-of-command failed to act accordingly out of fear of being labeled anti-Muslim and receiving a negative evaluation report. The counter-terrorism agencies knew Hasan was communicating with Al-Qaeda and dismissed it as academic research instead of delving deeper into the probability that a terrorist had infiltrated the ranks.

Even four hours after Hasan stood on a desk yelling Allahu Akbar! and opened fire, the FBI stated that they were not investigating the attack as an act of terrorism even as there were still reports of other gunmen on the loose. Meanwhile, the Army continues to dismiss it as a "tragedy" and an "isolated incident by a lone gunman" while the media has invented the psychological condition of post-traumatic stress disorder by proxy. There is more concern for promoting the appropriate information operation campaign and maintaining the illusion of safety than there is for actually exposing the weaknesses and faults in the system that allowed this to happen. We're even being told that damage to the Army's efforts at diversity would be a greater tragedy than the murder of the twelve soldiers -- how ironic the week of Veterans' Day.

This has nothing to do with being anti-Islamic. After numerous tours to Iraq and working with countless cultural advisors on Ft. Bragg, I know dozens of Muslims who I respect and admire greatly. This has everything to do with force protection and security being trumped by the concepts of political correctness and diversity. This has everything to do with a hypocritical system and culture that breeds timidity and dismissiveness in the interest of career advancement. If I preached a white-supremacist ideology or described Timothy McVeigh as a hero to the cause of freedom and liberty, how long do you think I would still be in the military drawing a salary, receiving educational benefits and getting promoted like Hasan did?

Hasan's radical ideology grew to the point that he committed mass murder because too many leaders were too afraid to lead out of fear of harming their career or the image of the Army. If those leaders don't have the intestinal fortitude, moral conviction or personal courage to stand up, speak up and protect soldiers, then retire, resign or get out of the way and let somebody else do it for you.

Shawn Keller is a Major in the United States Army stationed at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

Off To Afghanistan !

Sept 28, 2009, Dulles Airport.

It’s actually quite simple; if you want to write accurately about what’s happening in Afghanistan, you need to go there, spend some time, ask a lot of questions, and get out in the field with our Marines and soldiers as they’re working all three blocks of the 3-Block War. Will that make me an expert? No, but it’ll enable me to understand more of the shifting dynamics of a war where friends, enemies, and even our NATO have different perceptions and vastly different goals as to what “we” all want to accomplish.

And through the magic of the internet, I’ll be able to share it with you.

I’ll be spending the next five week in Afghanistan. I’ll be two week with the Army in the east, split between 10th MTN and the Nevada National Guard, and then I’ll roll south to Camp Leatherneck, and the Marines. It’s my forth trip, last summer I was in far-south Helmand Province with the Marines in Garmsir and I’ve spent four months in the east with various Marine Embedded Training Teams up-country. But it’s a far different war today from those under-resourced days of the last Administration; the Taliban has resurfaced this year with a vengeance, and only a few days ago General Stanley McChrystal said that without an additional 40,000 troops we were in danger of losing the war – and that he’d resign if he didn’t get them. If there is a ‘best’ time to embed in Afghanistan – this is surely it.

So as I sit here at Dulles with my Kevlar hanging off my shoulder bag, I’m getting some strange looks from those pompous lawyers and triple-chinned bureaucrats waddling past – Hey Fatso - Fuck You; I’m off to embed with our Marines and soldiers and you can kiss my ass; you have no clue as to what you’re missing in life, and you’re the lesser man for it.

Next Stop: Bagram AFB.

Afghans Also Divided on Western Troops

Afghans Divided Over Foreign Forces


By Matthew Green in Bamiyan and Fazel Reshad in Kabul
Financial Times
September 28, 2009

A bullet-shaped niche hewn from the mountainside is all that remains of the colossal stone Buddha that watched over the Bamiyan valley for 1,500 years before the Taliban demolished it with dynamite.

Fragments of the fallen giant and its smaller twin joined the debris left by armies past: from the carcasses of Soviet tanks to the hilltop ruins of the City of Screams, site of a 13th century massacre by Genghis Khan.

The Hazara community that lives along the valley has fared far better since US troops arrived in Afghanistan in 2001, seven months after the Taliban destroyed their statues, than they have under past invaders.

Even as the insurgency blazes in the south and smoulders in the north, their central Bamiyan province remains a rare Afghan haven, patrolled by New Zealanders who pride themselves on friendly relations with locals.

Traders in the bazaar in Bamiyan town, once a thriving stop on the Silk Route from Europe to Asia, have a simple solution to the dilemma faced by Barack Obama, the US president, over whether to deploy more troops.

“I would advise him to send more soldiers to kick out the Taliban,” said Azizullah, a shopkeeper who, like many Afghans, goes by one name. “We want freedom and we want progress.”

If such views represented a consensus, then it would be easier for Mr Obama to heed the recommendations of Stanley McChrystal, the top US general in Afghanistan, who says more troops and a new strategy are needed to stop the west losing the war.

But in the southern and eastern provinces, where the insurgency is fiercest, people are far more likely to see foreign soldiers as oppressors. “For 1,000 years we have never had such a Ramadan, where blood was flowing everywhere because of explosions,” said Haji Dawood Khan, a shopkeeper from Helmand province, referring to the Muslim holy month that ended earlier this month. “I don?t want any foreigners building roads or big buildings for me when I am cleaning blood from my home.”

Recognising the resentment that foreign forces have caused, Gen McChrystal argues that protecting civilians must be the focus for a new approach based on persuading Afghans to side with the western-backed government instead of the Taliban.

Evidence of systematic rigging in last month?s presidential elections has, however, deepened doubts over whether President Hamid Karzai is capable of transforming an administration often seen as absent, predatory or corrupt into an entity worthy of loyalty.

The bitter legacy left by NATO forces who have found themselves enmeshed in local feuds has widened mistrust. “The more foreign troops there are, the more people will hate them,” said Mohammad Karigar, a businessman from Kandahar province, another flashpoint of the insurgency.

Haji Kamrdin, a tribal leader from Khost province in the east, was equally dismissive of the big development programmes needed to underpin classic counterinsurgency doctrine. “It is impossible for Britain and its allies to build an Afghan state,” he said. “Such a thing can come only from an Afghan national movement, not as a gift from foreigners.”

There are dissenting voices, even in the south, who see sense in Gen McChrystal?s strategy. Haji Ghafoor, a tribal elder from Wardak province, said: “You need the flexibility that more troops give you to maintain momentum.”

However, the only unambiguous point of agreement between Afghans and the general is on the need to accelerate training of the army and police to allow foreign forces to leave. “They must take the money that they would spend on sending more troops and use the money for the Afghan police and army,” said Shah Mahmood, a clerk from Kandahar.

In a country that has experienced centuries of invasion, the narrative surrounding foreign forces tends to blur into a story of oppression, regardless of whether the outsiders are Russians, Pakistani intelligence agents supporting the Taliban in the 1990s, or Nato troops.

Of 17 Afghans interviewed in recent days, three said they believed Washington was bankrolling the insurgency to justify a long-term presence in Afghanistan. “If the US wants to remove the Taliban, they could do it easily,” said Mohammed Akram, an elder who lives at the foot of the mountains where the Buddhas once stood. “The US is supporting both sides.”

Additional reporting by Ahmad Wali Sarhadi.

Finally - Gates Supports More Troops

WASHINGTON (CNN) – The Afghanistan conflict has proven more difficult than anticipated, Defense Secretary Robert Gates said in echoing President Barack Obama’s deliberative approach on whether to send more troops.

In an interview broadcast Sunday on CNN’s State of the Union, Gates said the focus on Iraq by the previous administration of President George W. Bush meant the operation in Afghanistan has been limited.

“The reality is, we were fighting a holding action,” Gates said of situation under Bush, whom he also served as defense secretary.

“We were very deeply engaged in Iraq,” Gates said, later adding: “We were too stretched to do more. And I think we did not have the kind of comprehensive strategy that … we have now.”
Setting an exit strategy for Afghanistan would be a mistake, but the United States also will closely monitor developments to ensure its strategy is achieving desired results, Gates said.

Obama is under increasing pressure from congressional Republicans who favor sending more troops, as desired by commanding Gen. Stanley McChrystal, while many of the president’s fellow Democrats are expressing resistance.

Gates said McChrystal “found a situation in Afghanistan that is more serious than … we had thought and that he had thought before going out there.”

Asked why the Obama administration has yet to decide on McChrystal’s assessment that more troops will be necessary to defeat insurgents and protect the local population, Gates said it would take more time to properly analyze the situation.

"I think we are in the middle of a review," Gates told CNN Chief National Correspondent John King, adding : “Once we're confident we have the strategy right, then — then we'll address the question of additional resources.”

Gates also noted that any additional combat troops for Afghanistan "really probably could not begin to flow" until January 2010.

He disagreed with setting a clear exit strategy for Afghanistan.

"The notion of timelines and exit strategies and so on, frankly, I think would all be a strategic mistake," Gates said. "The reality is — failure in Afghanistan would be a huge setback for the United States.

“[The] Taliban and Al Qaeda, as far as they're concerned, defeated one superpower, [the Soviet Union],” he continued. “For them to be seen to defeat a second, I think, would have catastrophic consequences in terms of energizing the extremist movement, Al Qaeda recruitment, operations, fundraising, and so on. I think it would be a huge setback for the United States.”

Gates said the process should be defining a strategy “that we think can be successful, and then to pursue it and pursue it with confidence and resolution." At the same time, Gates suggested that the administration was not moving toward an open-ended, indefinite commitment to having a U.S. military presence in Afghanistan.

"I think that we are being very careful to look at this as we go along," Gates said. "We've put out metrics so that we can measure whether or not we're making progress. And if we're not making progress, then we're prepared to adjust our strategy, just as we're looking at whether adjustments are needed right now."

Afghan Policy: The 5 Votes That Matter

What Next In Afghanistan? The Five People Obama Is Asking.

President Obama has said he is reviewing US strategy in Afghanistan. Here are five of the most important people he is listening to – and what they might be telling him.

By Mark Sappenfield
Christian Science Monitor (csmonitor.com)
September 24, 2009

When he announced his administration’s new strategy for Afghanistan this spring, President Obama added an important asterisk.

“Going forward, we will not blindly stay the course,” he said March 27. “We will review whether we are using the right tools and tactics to make progress towards accomplishing our goals.”

Now, he is making good on that promise.

Mr. Obama has already held one meeting of his top foreign policy and military advisers to discuss the Afghan war, according to news reports. Several more are expected, beginning next week.

What comes out of this high-level review could determine whether tens of thousands more American troops head to Afghanistan or whether America essentially pulls back and focuses on targeted counterterrorism operations against Al Qaeda.

Here is what is known about where the members of the National Security Council might stand.

President Obama
Back in March, Obama said his goal was “to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat Al Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and to prevent their return to either country in the future.”

He has consistently repeated that goal. But his strategic calculus about how to do that appears to be changing.

Media reports suggest that Obama has been shaken by the allegations of widespread fraud in Afghanistan’s Aug. 20 presidential elections. The results have sowed doubt about whether President Hamid Karzai is a reliable partner.

Also a factor is the dire battlefield assessment by Gen. Stanley McChrystal, who is expected to request as many as 40,000 more troops. At a time when Obama is strained to his political limit by the healthcare debate, the prospect of having to sell an Afghan troop surge is decidedly unpalatable.

The shift in Obama’s outlook was evident Sunday, when Obama told “Meet the Press”: “I’m not interested in just being in Afghanistan for the sake of being in Afghanistan or saving face.”

The comment contrasted strikingly to the tone of an Aug. 17 speech – three days before the Afghan election – when he said that the war in Afghanistan “is fundamental to the defense of our people.”

Vice President Joe Biden
So far, Vice President Biden has been the most outspoken critic of expanding the Afghan war.

In different venues, he has proposed different courses of action.

In an interview with CNN, he advocated a wait-and-see approach. He noted that Obama approved 21,000 more troops for Afghanistan in March, and not all of them have even arrived.

“They’re now only getting in place; they’re not all fully in place and deployed,” he said, calling discussion of adding troops “premature.”

More controversial, however, is his advocacy of a plan to scale back US forces and move toward a narrower counterterrorism strategy. In short, the US military would use missiles fired from drones and special forces operations to attack Al Qaeda in Pakistan and prevent their return to Afghanistan.

Such a strategy would return to the central goal – targeting Al Qaeda – without having to rebuild a corrupt and impoverished nation.

Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton
Like Obama, Secretary Clinton has said she is open to any options going forward, so long as they keep Al Qaeda at bay.

“If Afghanistan were taken over by the Taliban, I can’t tell you how fast Al Qaeda would be back in Afghanistan,” she said in an interview with PBS’s “NewsHour” Monday.

But Clinton was not necessarily swayed by McChrystal’s assertion that the US must add more troops to accomplish this.

“I can only tell you there are other assessments from, you know, very expert military analysts who have worked in counterinsurgencies that are the exact opposite [of McChrystal’s],” she said. “So what our goal is, is to take all of this incoming data and sort it out.”

National Security Adviser James Jones
While General Jones has not given a recent indication of where he stands on Afghan strategy, past statements provide some potential insight.

On a trip to Afghanistan in June, Jones told commanders not to expect any more troops this year. Clearly, much has changed since then. McChrystal had just been confirmed as the new US commander in Afghanistan, for instance.

Yet Jones seemed to think the time for troop requests ended when Obama announced his new strategy in March.

“Everybody had their day in court, so to speak, before the president made his decision,” he told McClatchy news service in an article published July 1. “We signed off on the strategy, and now we’re in the implementation phase.”

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Adm. Mike MullenMullen’s position in the debate is virtually certain.

He has endorsed McChrystal’s report and told Congress Sept. 15 that “a properly resourced counterinsurgency probably means more forces.”

Mullen’s viewpoints likely reflect those of the Pentagon brass, which means the full weight of military support is behind McChrystal and his assertion that the situation in Afghanistan “demands a comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy.”

Defense Secretary Robert Gates

Gates appears to be the biggest wild card.

As secretary of Defense and a Republican whose opinion is widely respected both in the administration and in Congress, his opinion would be influential. Yet of all Obama’s main advisers, he has been perhaps the most obviously conflicted.

Gates is a strong supporter of McChrystal, having engineered the retirement of McChrystal’s predecessor in order to get his man into Afghanistan.

On Sept. 3, Gates said: “I’m very open to the recommendations and certainly the perspective of General McChrystal.” Yet in general, Gates has been wary of adding more troops, fearing that it would make the US look like occupiers.

Civilian Political Weasels Stymie Afghan Policy

General's Review Creates Rupture

As Military Backs Call for More Troops In Afghanistan, Civilian Advisers Balk
By Karen DeYoung
Washington Post
Tuesday, September 22, 2009

Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal's grim assessment of the Afghanistan war has opened a divide between the military, which is pushing for an early decision to send more troops, and civilian policymakers who are increasingly doubtful of an escalating nation-building effort.

Senior military officials emphasized Monday that McChrystal's conclusion that the U.S. effort in Afghanistan "will likely result in failure" without an urgent infusion of troops has been endorsed by the uniformed leadership. That includes Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Mike Mullen and Gen. David H. Petraeus, the head of U.S. Central Command and architect of the troop "surge" strategy widely seen as helping U.S. forces turn the corner in Iraq.

But before any decision is made, some of President Obama's civilian advisers have proposed looking at other, less costly options to address his primary goal of preventing al-Qaeda from reestablishing itself in Afghanistan. Those options include a redirection of U.S. efforts -- away from protecting the Afghan population and building the Afghan state and toward persuading the Taliban to stop fighting -- as well as an escalation of targeted attacks against al-Qaeda itself in Pakistan and elsewhere.

Obama's public remarks on Afghanistan indicate that he has begun to rethink the counterinsurgency strategy he set in motion six months ago, even as his generals have embraced it. The equation on the ground has changed markedly since his March announcement, with attacks by Taliban fighters showing greater sophistication, U.S. casualties rising, and the chances increasing that Afghanistan will be left with an illegitimate government after widespread fraud in recent presidential elections.

In television interviews Sunday, Obama said he would take his time in weighing McChrystal's recommendations and an anticipated formal request for more troops. "The first question is: Are we doing the right thing?" Obama said on CNN. "Are we pursuing the right strategy?"

The commander's report, administration officials said, is only one of many "inputs" the president is considering. Others include assessments from the State Department, the intelligence community and his White House advisers.

Obama's decision is complicated by a deepening domestic political divide and no guarantee of success whichever option he chooses. One observer, characterizing the president's dilemma at its most extreme, said: "He can send more troops and it will be a disaster and he will destroy the Democratic Party. Or he can send no more troops and it will be a disaster and the Republicans will say he lost the war."

Few lawmakers had seen McChrystal's closely held report before an unclassified version was published by The Washington Post on its Web site Sunday night. Their reactions were sharply divided along party lines, with many Republicans advocating full support for the military commander.

House Minority Leader John A. Boehner (R-Ohio) said in a statement that he was "deeply troubled . . . by reports that the White House is delaying action on the General's request for more troops" and was questioning the "integrated civilian-military counterinsurgency" Obama himself set in motion. "It's time for the President to clarify where he stands on the strategy he has articulated," Boehner said, "because the longer we wait the more we put our troops at risk."

Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.) said that "any failure to act decisively in response to General McChrystal's request could serve to undermine the other good decisions the president has made" on Afghanistan.

But Sen. John F. Kerry (D-Mass.), chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and a Navy veteran of Vietnam who once led opposition to that war, praised Obama's deliberative pace.

"All the president is saying is that he wants to take the time to make sure this decision is not done like the Gulf of Tonkin" resolution, where "underlying assumptions aren't questioned," Kerry said. The 1964 joint congressional resolution, based on false information about North Vietnamese actions and adopted amid an anti-communist frenzy, authorized President Lyndon B. Johnson to use military force in Southeast Asia.

"You've got to figure out . . . what is the counterinsurgency mission," Kerry said. "The president has all the right in the world to properly vet that mission and define it. It may well be we'll all decide [McChrystal] is absolutely correct, and the mission he's defined is correct."

Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates, who has positioned himself between the urgency expressed by military commanders and those calling for a reconsideration of the strategy, last week suggested that all involved take a "deep breath." He has told McChrystal to delay sending his formal request for additional resources until the policy discussion is further along.

But senior military officials have expressed growing frustration, while warning that delay could be costly. "Time does matter," said one military official. "The longer the situation deteriorates, the tougher to reclaim" the initiative against Taliban forces. Military and civilian officials agreed to discuss White House decision-making and McChrystal's report on the condition of anonymity.

This military official and others cautioned that any strategy revision that resulted in a pullback by U.S. and NATO forces would leave Taliban forces in uncontested control of territory and could lead to a return of civil war in Afghanistan, opening the door to reestablishment of al-Qaeda sanctuaries there.

But some civilian officials believe that such a scenario is based on possibly faulty assumptions about who the Taliban insurgents are, what their aims may be, and whether some can be co-opted. If Obama's core objective is to prevent al-Qaeda from returning to Afghanistan, this reasoning goes, it may not depend on defeating the Taliban. An equally viable policy, they argue, could include stepped-up, targeted attacks on al-Qaeda's sanctuaries in Pakistan and convincing amenable Taliban fighters that it is in their best interests to keep al-Qaeda out of Afghanistan.

Why The Confusion On Afghan Policy?

Wavering On Afghanistan?
President Obama seems to have forgotten his own arguments for a counterinsurgency campaign.

Washington Post
September 22, 2009

IT WAS ONLY last March 27 that President Obama outlined in a major speech what he called "a comprehensive new strategy for Afghanistan" that, he added, "marks the conclusion of a careful policy review." That strategy unambiguously stated that the United States would prevent the return of a Taliban government and "enhance the military, governance and economic capacity" of the country. We strongly supported the president's conclusion that those goals were essential to preventing another attack on the United States by al-Qaeda and its extremist allies.

So it was a little startling to hear Mr. Obama suggest in several televised interviews on Sunday that he had second thoughts. "We are in the process of working through that strategy," said on CNN." The first question is . . . are we pursuing the right strategy?" On NBC he said, "if supporting the Afghan national government and building capacity for their army and securing certain provinces advances that strategy" of defeating al-Qaeda, "then we'll move forward. But if it doesn't, then I'm not interested in just being in Afghanistan for the sake of being in Afghanistan."

The president's doubts come at a crucial moment. He has just received a report from the commander he appointed, Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, saying the United States and its allies are in danger of losing the war if they do not work more effectively to shore up the Afghan government and army and protect the population from insurgents. Gen. McChrystal, along with his seniors in Washington, believe that this counterinsurgency strategy is the only route to success, and that it will require a commitment of substantial additional resources, including thousands more U.S. troops next year.

The generals believed they had Mr. Obama's commitment to their approach after the policy review last spring. Now the president appears to be distancing himself from his commanders -- including the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen, who testified before Congress last week that more forces would be needed.

What has changed since March? As Mr. Obama noted, Afghanistan's presidential election has been plagued by allegations of fraud, sharpening questions about whether the government can be a reliable partner. Taliban attacks are spreading despite the deployment of 21,000 additional troops approved by the president earlier this year. Some in and outside the administration have argued for a more limited strategy centered on striking al-Qaeda's leaders, giving up the more ambitious political and economic tasks built into the counterinsurgency doctrine.

It's hard to see, however, how Mr. Obama can refute the analysis he offered last March. "If the Afghan government falls to the Taliban or allows al-Qaeda to go unchallenged," he said then, "that country will again be a base for terrorists who want to kill as many of our people as they possibly can." Afghanistan, he continued, "is inextricably linked to the future of its neighbor, Pakistan," where al-Qaeda and the Taliban now aim at seizing control of a state that possesses nuclear weapons. Moreover, Mr. Obama said, "a return to Taliban rule would condemn their country to brutal governance and the denial of basic human rights to the Afghan people- especially women and girls."

"To succeed, we and our friends and allies must reverse the Taliban's gains, and promote a more capable and accountable Afghan government," Mr. Obama concluded. As Gen. McChrystal's report makes very clear, keeping faith with that goal will require more troops, more resources and years of patience. Yet to break with it would both dishonor and endanger this country. As the president put it, "the world cannot afford the price that will come due if Afghanistan slides back into chaos."

Needed: Bi-Partisan Support on Afghanistan

Obama's Befuddling Afghan Policy
Why is the president hesitating on more troops to fight his 'war of necessity'?

By Leslie H. Gelb
Wall Street Journal
September 22, 2009

I'm lost on President Barack Obama's Afghanistan policy—along with most of Congress and the U.S. military. Not quite eight months ago, Mr. Obama pledged to "defeat" al Qaeda in Afghanistan by transforming that country's political and economic infrastructure, training Afghan forces and adding 21,000 U.S. forces for starters. He proclaimed Afghanistan's strategic centrality to prevent Muslim extremism from taking over Pakistan—an even more vital nation because of its nuclear weapons. And a mere three weeks ago, he punctuated his commitments by proclaiming that Afghanistan is a "war of necessity," not one of choice. White House spokesmen reinforced this by promising that the president would "fully resource" the war.

Yet less than one week ago, Mr. Obama said the following about troop increases: "I'm going to take a very deliberate process in making those decisions. There is no immediate decision pending on resources, because one of the things that I'm absolutely clear about is you have to get the strategy right and then make a determination about resources." He repeated that on Sunday's talk shows.

Are we now to understand that he made all those previous declarations and decisions without a strategy he was committed to? Prior to his recent statements, it seemed clear that the president and his advisers had adopted a strategy already—the counterinsurgency one—and that Gen. Stanley McChrystal was tapped precisely because he would implement that plan. The idea, to repeat, was to deploy forces sufficient to clear territory of Taliban threats, hold that territory, and build up the sinews of the country behind that.

Nothing significant has changed to account for the shift from Mr. Obama's confident policy proclamations to his temporizing statements of recent days. The president certainly understood before last week that the situation in Afghanistan was deteriorating. And he knew when he was inaugurated and when he first uttered his colorful "war of necessity" phrase that his party, and the public generally, were increasingly opposed to the war.

Americans are now confused and caught somewhere between remembering the president's insistence on Afghanistan's importance to U.S. security and rapidly rising pressure from his party to bring the troops home.

What is to be done? Even though I strongly believe that the United States does not have vital interests in Afghanistan, I also believe that Mr. Obama can't simply walk away from the war. A lot of Democrats don't seem to fathom this. At a minimum, the president has got to give Afghan allies a fighting chance to hold their own and prepare the ground to blunt the Taliban and al Qaeda. That will take time.

For their part, Republicans and others who advocate an open-ended U.S. commitment can't simply ignore the fact that political time is running out at home. It would be utterly irresponsible of them to simply shake their fingers at the Democrats and wait for them to fail in Afghanistan. Despite President George W. Bush's rhetoric on Iraq, he saw the writing on the wall and agreed to an American withdrawal. And if the hard-headed realists among conservatives aren't just playing political games, they also have to honor the time problem.
Democrats have to realize that more time is needed, and Republicans must acknowledge that America's combat commitment cannot be indefinite. If political leaders accept these underlying political realities, the Obama administration can craft a strategy along the following lines:

*Surge two additional combat brigades, or roughly 10,000 troops, to lift the U.S. total to about 78,000 from 68,000.

*Deploy an additional 5,000 to 10,000 troops strictly for the purpose of training and supporting Afghan police and armed forces, and embed U.S. advisers with heavy intelligence backup. As important as increasing troop numbers is changing the American attitude toward the war. Our armed forces can't continue to treat most problems as American problems, and they must begin to turn over real authority to the Afghans.

*Provide support to leaders in Kabul and tribal leaders around the country who will oppose the Taliban and fight for their independence.

*Put money on the table to divide Taliban from Taliban, and Taliban from al Qaeda. We know many of them respond to financial—as well as security—inducements.

*Build alliances to contain the Taliban and other regional extremists. Focus on India, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Russia, China, and yes, even Iran, which cooperated with Washington at the outset of the Afghan war. These states share common interests with America in combating al Qaeda-like terrorism and the drug trade.

*Set up tough and credible deterrence capabilities. It's particularly critical to retain special operations forces in Afghanistan with the ability to fire from drones and perform other operations. Capabilities for missile and air attacks launched from beyond Afghanistan need to be honed as well. Token attacks won't be enough.

Putting this strategy and the attendant capabilities in place would take two to three years. But doing so would make this war Afghanistan's responsibility. It must be this way in order to avoid defeat. If the war remains essentially America's, it will guarantee failure. As almost always in such situations, the Afghans will tire of their American saviors. Even more certainly, Americans will eventually lose all patience and demand immediate pullouts, leaving Afghans unprepared to defend themselves.

The U.S. now faces many very serious troubles abroad. These were all born before the Obama presidency. The president's failure in Afghanistan would be America's failure, and we cannot allow this to happen. Defeat for America in Afghanistan and Pakistan can be avoided only if Democrats acknowledge that the Afghans need major help for two to three more years, and Republicans admit that the political clock at home won't give them much more time than that.

McChrystal - More Troops or We Fail....

McChrystal: More Forces or 'Mission Failure'

Washington Post
12:00 AM EDT Monday, September 21, 2009

The top U.S. and NATO commander in Afghanistan warns in an urgent, confidential assessment of the war that he needs more forces within the next year and bluntly states that without them, the eight-year conflict "will likely result in failure," according to a copy of the 66-page document obtained by The Washington Post.

F'ing Pak's Think They're A Serious Country

AQ Khan blows the whistle on Pakistan

CHIDANAND RAJGHATTA, TNN
The Times of India
20 September 2009

WASHINGTON: An angry, humiliated, and wounded A.Q.Khan has finally made public and official what has long been suspected: his nuclear proliferation activities that included exchanging and passing blue-prints and equipment to China, Iran, North Korea, and Libya was done at the behest of the Pakistani government and military, and he was forced to take the rap for it.

"The bastards first used us and are now playing dirty games with us" Khan writes about the Pakistani leadership in a December 2003 letter to his wife Henny that has finally been made public by an interlocutor. "Darling, if the government plays any mischief with me take a tough stand,'' he tells his wife, adding, ''They might try to get rid of me to cover up all the things they got done by me.''

But Henny was unable to play hardball because Khan had also sent copies of that letter to his daughter Dina in London, and to his niece Kausar Khan in Amsterdam through his brother, a Pakistan Airlines executive. Pakistani intelligence agencies got wind of it and threatened the well-being of the family, forcing him to recant and publicly take the blame for the proliferation activities in a humiliating television spectacle engineered by then military ruler Pervez Musharraf.

However, a copy of the four-page letter reached Khan’s long-time journalistic contact Simon Henderson in 2007. In fact, in the letter, Khan tells his wife, ''Get in touch with Simon Henderson and give him all the details.'' Henderson says when he acquired the copy of the letter, he was shocked. His acquaintance with Khan goes back to the late 1970s, but it was never intimate, and consisted of an occasional
interviews and conversations, and seasonal greetings.

Describing the four-page letter as ''extraordinary,'' Henderson says in numbered paragraphs, it outlines Pakistan’s nuclear co-operation with China, Iran and North Korea, and also mentions Libya. Some of the disclosures are stunning , and in one para that is bound to embarrass Beijing, besides implicating it, Khan writes about how Pakistan helped China in enrichment technology in return for bomb blueprints.

''We put up a centrifuge plant at Hanzhong (250km southwest of Xian),” Khan writes. “The Chinese gave us drawings of the nuclear weapon, gave us 50kg of enriched uranium, gave us 10 tons of UF6 (natural) and 5 tons of UF6 (3%).'' UF6 is uranium hexafluoride, the gaseous feedstock for an enrichment plan.

On Iran, the letter says: ''Probably with the blessings of Benazir Bhutto, General Imtiaz [Benazir’s defence adviser, now dead] asked me to give a set of drawings and some components to the Iranians. The names and addresses of suppliers were also given to the Iranians.''

On North Korea:" A now-retired general] took $3 million through me from the N. Koreans and asked me to give some drawings and machines.''

Henderson does not explain why he waited nearly two years since he got hold of the letter to make it public. But he writes sympathetically about Khan’s travails in Pakistan, where he is held largely incommunicado under house arrest. The Pakistani government and the military have repeatedly rejected and challenged court orders to free him, and an episode last month, where Khan was freed just for a day on court orders before Islamabad locked him up again under pressure from Washington, appears to have precipitated the leak of the explosive letter.

Henderson’s Sunday Times expose also implicates the U.S and other western powers, who he says, basically shoved Islamabad’s rampant proliferation (while blaming it solely on Khan) under the carpet in order to get Pakistan’s cooperation in the war on terror. The move also saved Washington from huge embarrassment since it was basically asleep on the watch when Pakistan began its nuclear proliferation and then
winked at it when it was discovered, all the while lavishing billions in military supplies on its unstable client state.

Henderson also implicitly defends Khan from charges that he profited from proliferation activities, as alleged by deposed military ruler Pervez Musharraf. Khan, he says, is adamant that he never sold nuclear secrets for personal gain. So what about the millions of dollars he reportedly made?

''Nothing was confiscated from him and no reported investigation turned up hidden accounts. Having planted rumours about Khan’s greed, Pakistani officials were curiously indifferent to following them through,'' Henderson writes.

According to Henderson, much was made of a ''hotel'', named after Khan’s wife, Henny, built by a local tour guide with the help of money from Khan and a group of friends in Timbuktu. But it is a modest structure at best, more of a guesthouse, he says. A weekend home at Bani Gala, outside Islamabad, where Khan went to relax, is hardly the palace that some reports have made it.

In fact, says Henderson, Khan was close to being broke by the summer 2007, when he was finding it difficult to make ends meet on his pension of 12,200 (Pakistani) rupees per month. After pleading with General Khalid Kidwai, the officer supervising both Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and Khan, the pension was increased to $2,500 per month and there was a one-off lump-sum payment of the equivalent of $50,000. Hendersen says he has copies of the agreement and cheques.

Henderson’s 3000-word expose also reveals a couple of intriguing tid-bits that should interest the world’s strategic community, including New Delhi. Besides details of the Pakistan-China nexus, he says Pakistan tested only two devices in its 1998 tit-for-tat nuclear tests that followed India.

While Pakistan claims it conducted six tests to be one-up on India’s five tests, Western experts and seismologists have long said they recorded only two signals for devices that measured between two and four kilotons. Khan also states clearly that China gave Pakistan designs for the nuclear bombs.

In fact, in one colorful passage in his article, Henderson describes how Khan was warned by a Chinese counterpart about the Pakistani Army. On a visit to Kahuta, Li Chew, the senior minister who ran China’s nuclear-weapons programme, tells Khan, ''As long as they need the bomb, they will lick your balls. As soon as you have delivered the bomb, they will kick your balls.''

Henderson himself seems deeply conscious of any perception that he is close to Khan or that he is a cat’s paw for any country. ''Any relationship with a source is fraught with potential difficulties. One doesn’t want to be blind to the chance of being used. Government officials and politicians in any country are seldom interested in the simple truth. They all have their particular story to tell. In this
context, I am frankly amazed that Khan has chosen me to be his interlocutor with the world,'' he writes.

But Pakistani authorities were clearly aware that he and Khan had been in touch and Khan may have managed to smuggle a copy of the letter implicating Islamabad to him. Henderson says in a court document that Khan was asked to sign when he was promised freedom, there is a line that read “That in case Mr Simon Henderson or anyone else proceeds with the publication of any information or material anywhere in the world, I
affirm that it would not be based on any input from me and I disown it.” That line was eventually deleted and replaced with a more general prohibition about unnamed ''specific media personnel."

In other words, stand by for a flurry of denials.

Yet ANOTHER Contractor Scandal...

Pakistan Police Raid U.S. ContractorAssociated Press
Sept 19, 2009

ISLAMABAD -- Pakistani police raided a local security firm that helps protect the U.S. Embassy on Saturday, seizing dozens of allegedly unlicensed weapons at a time when unusually intense media scrutiny of America's use of private contractors has deepened anti-U.S. sentiment here.

Pakistani police raided a local security firm that has a contract with the U.S. Embassy, seizing dozens of allegedly unlicensed weapons at a time when American use of private contractors is under unusual scrutiny here, officials said.

Two employees of the Inter-Risk company were arrested during the raids in Islamabad, police official Rana Akram told a news conference. Reporters were shown the disputed weapons -- 61 assault rifles and nine pistols. Mr. Akram said police were seeking the firm's owner.

U.S. Embassy spokesman Rick Snelsire said the U.S. contract with Inter-Risk took effect at the start of 2009. It is believed to be the first contract the firm has signed with the U.S., said Mr. Snelsire, who did not have a figure for its amount.

"Our understanding is they obtained licenses with whatever they brought into the country to meet the contractual needs," he said. "We told the government that we had a contract with Inter-Risk, that Inter-Risk would be providing security at the embassy and our consulates."

Mr. Akram said he had no idea about any U.S. links to Inter-Risk, but the company was recently mentioned in local media reports that have been trying to establish the types of private security firms American diplomats use in Pakistan.

In particular, Pakistani reporters, anti-U.S. bloggers and others have suggested the U.S. is using the American firm formerly known as Blackwater -- a claim that chills many Pakistanis because of the company's alleged involvement in killings of Iraqi civilians.

The U.S. Embassy denies it uses Blackwater - now known as Xe Services - in Pakistan.

Scandals involving U.S. private contractors have occurred elsewhere in the region.

In Washington on Friday, the Commission on Wartime Contracting heard testimony about another contractor - ArmorGroup North America --involving alleged illegal and immoral conduct by its guards at the U.S. Embassy in Afghanistan.

The Iraqi government refused to grant Xe Services an operating license earlier this year amid continued outrage over a 2007 lethal firefight involving some of its employees in Baghdad, although the State Department has temporarily extended a contract with a Xe subsidiary to protect U.S. diplomats in Iraq.

Many of the reports in Pakistan have been fueled by U.S. plans to expand its embassy space and staff. Among the other rumors the U.S. denies: that 1,000 U.S. Marines will land in the capital, and that Americans will set up a Guantanamo-style prison.

The U.S. says it needs to add hundreds more staff to allow it to disburse billions of dollars in additional aid to Pakistan.

Legislation making its way through Congress will triple nonmilitary aid to Pakistan -- one version would provide $1.5 billion a year over five years in humanitarian and economic aid. The goal is to improve education and other areas, lessening the allure of extremism.

The U.S. considers stability in Pakistan critical to helping the faltering war effort in neighboring Afghanistan, and has pressed Pakistan to crack down on extremism on its soil.

Al Qaeda and Taliban fighters are believed to use Pakistan's northwestern regions bordering Afghanistan as hide-outs. Their presence has fueled violence in Pakistani territory, including attacks that pit Sunni Muslims against Shiite Muslims.

Copyright © 2009 Associated Press

Forget "Enablers" - Just Send in the Marines

Gates To Boost 'Enablers' In Afghanistan Mission

By Ann Scott Tyson
Washington Post
September 18, 2009

Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates said Thursday that he has ordered the deployment of as many as 3,000 more U.S. troops to Afghanistan to meet what the top commander there has described as pressing security needs.

The additional troops, who Gates said were requested by Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, the top U.S. and NATO commander in Afghanistan, are not part of units designated to be deployed under President Obama's original orders to send 21,000 more service members to Afghanistan this year.

Senior defense officials said, however, that Gates has the flexibility to add the forces without exceeding the planned overall increase there by the end of this year. Some units Obama ordered have not deployed at full strength, and McChrystal has decided that at least 1,000 troops currently in Afghanistan are not needed.

"I'm prepared to ask for the flexibility to send more enablers if we need to before the president makes a decision on whether or not to send significant additional combat troops," Gates said at a Pentagon news conference, using the term "enablers" to refer to support troops as opposed to combat units.

The 2,500 to 3,000 troops include explosive ordnance disposal teams, route clearance teams, medevac units and intelligence specialists needed to combat the growing threat of impro vised explosive devices, or IEDs, which are the leading cause of death among U.S. forces in the country.

Under Obama's earlier order, the total number of U.S. troops in Afghanistan can reach 68,000.

"No matter what we do about more combat troops, our forces there require the best counter-IED capabilities we can provide," said Pentagon spokesman Geoff Morrell.

Meanwhile, McChrystal has finished drawing up his request for what is expected to be thousands or tens of thousands of additional trainers and combat troops for Afghanistan, but he is awaiting instructions before submitting the request to the Pentagon.

Senior defense officials said that, in effect, McChrystal has been asked to delay submitting the request.

"We're working through the process by which we want that submitted," Gates told reporters, without elaborating.

Asked when Obama would make a decision on sending more troops to Afghanistan, Gates replied: "I don't want to get into t! he timing. The president will make his decision when the questions that he has asked and the assessments that are going on have been completed. And I don't think anybody should put any conditions on that."

Gates also stressed that the uncertainty in the aftermath of the disputed presidential election in Afghanistan has created new challenges for the administration as it assesses its strategy. Such political questions must be weighed by the administration and are "outside of General McChrystal's area of authority," Gates said.

Gates said McChrystal's assessment is "a pre-decisional document," indicating that it should not be released publicly. On Thursday, the Pentagon distributed only a small number of copies of the still-classified assessment to the House and Senate. Those copies were available only to a select few members.

Lawmakers have been pressing the administration to be more forthcoming about its strategy in Afghanistan and have urged that it bring! McChrystal to Washington to testify. On Thursday, House Minority Lead er John A. Boehner (R-Ohio) issued another call to hear from the general, whom Obama put in charge in June.

"It is imperative that the American people and members of Congress hear from General McChrystal directly about the situation on the ground -- and soon," Boehner said.

Boehner noted that when Gen. David H. Petraeus was the top commander in Iraq, he returned to testify and "spoke plainly" about his strategy.

"That testimony was critical to Congress making informed decisions regarding success in our mission there," Boehner said. "The request to hear from General McChrystal is bipartisan and appropriate. The American people have real concerns about what's going on in Afghanistan, and so do I."

Afghanistan: Taliban - Karzai - US

Why The Taliban Is Gaining Ground In Afghanistan

By Tim McGirk
Time.com
Sept 16, 2009

The Taliban today in Afghanistan is a markedly different movement from that of those warriors whose one-eyed leader, Mullah Omar, riding on a motorcycle, escaped capture from American forces in Kandahar in December 2001. Mullah Omar is still their leader, even though, as a senior Afghan intelligence official told TIME, he is thought to be hiding across the border in Pakistan, moving between the towns of Quetta and Zob in the scorched Baluchistan desert. Nowadays, though, the Taliban encompasses a vast and disparate array of players. A look at who they are is key to understanding why they are gaining ground against 63,000 U.S. troops and their NATO partners after eight years of guerrilla war.

The Taliban is not monolithic. It composed of several layers: a hard-core group of former Taliban commanders (including Mullah Omar) who operate out of sanctuaries across the border in Pakistan and who maintain ties with Pakistan's ISI intelligence agency (though Islamabad vehemently denies this); bands linked to al-Qaeda whose ranks have recently swelled with Arab, Chechen and Uzbek fighters operating in the craggy, northeastern ranges of Afghanistan; and, a last group, probably the largest, made up of local tribesmen who have allied themselves loosely with the Taliban as a result of President Hamid Karzai's often corrupt provincial officials pitting one tribe against another. Mullah Salam, a tribal elder from Helmand province, scene of heavy fighting between Taliban and NATO forces, told TIME why he switched to the Taliban: "Karzai's people made promises to me, and I in turn made them to my tribe, but these were never honored." This last segment of the Taliban is also made up of those seeking justice against NATO forces, a roster likely to grow after coalition jets killed over 30 villagers in Kunduz who were filling up fuel from hijacked NATO tankers.

Western military officials, diplomats and Afghan officials interviewed by TIME all agree that the battle with the Taliban is entering a critical phase, especially after the Aug. 20 presidential elections marred by fraud. Karzai's credibility is now damaged. After 30 years of war, Afghans have developed a sixth sense about survival: they can detect subtle shifts of power. Rarely do they have qualms about changing to the winning side, even in midconflict. In an essay on the Taliban for Foreign Affairs magazine, Afghanistan expert Michael Semple and MIT political scientist Fotini Christia write: "Changing sides, realigning, flipping — whatever you want to call it — is the Afghan way of war."

And right now, that Afghan sixth sense is telling them that the U.S. and the other Western nations are losing the heart for battle. In the Pashtun strongholds of Afghanistan, it is now perceived to be a good idea for a tribe to start siding with the Taliban, even though members of the tribe may not agree with their harsh medievalism. A critical mass is gathering, experts say. Elders who belong to once neutral tribes in Kandahar province are now telling their youths to take up arms against the foreign invaders, as their fathers did back in the 1980s against the Red Army. In Tahkt-e-Pul, on the edges of Kandahar city, an influential mullah recently refused to preside over the funeral of a dead Afghan government soldier, a local boy; meanwhile a Taliban, who died fighting the Americans or the British, was honored as a brave martyr. It is a disturbing change among Afghans who in 2001, after the benighted years of the Taliban, welcomed foreigners bringing aid and progress.

The Taliban is surging into the vacuum created by Karzai's government, which is based on patronage rather than competence, coupled with the international community's often bungled and chaotic distribution of aid. One indication of how far the Taliban have come: this summer, Mullah Omar tried to consolidate his grip on his unruly commanders with a 13-page Code of Conduct (among the rules: no senior government officials are to be executed without his say-so, and civilian casualties must be minimized when attacking foreign troops). In large swathes of the southern provinces of Helmand, Kandahar, Zabol, Oruzgan, Paktia and Paktika, a shadow Islamic republic of the Taliban already exists, with governors, a radio station, law-enforcing militias and courts. In recent months, the Taliban opened a northern front in Kunduz, Baghlan and Badakshan provinces, with a strong contingent of al-Qaeda foreigners among them, according to senior Afghan officials. In all these areas, a new saying prevails: "Government courts for the rich (because the judges are bribable), Taliban justice for the poor." And Taliban justice, they say, is usually more swift and fair.

But a Taliban win is not necessarily inevitable. Non-Pashtuns like the Tajiks, Hazaras and other minorities are certainly resisting a return of the Taliban; the parts of the country that they dominate, including sections of central and northern Afghanistan, are relatively peaceful. Also, while American and European casualties may be rising — 810 U.S. servicemen have died so far in the eight-year conflict — so has the number of Taliban deaths. Dozens of Taliban are killed every week.

Meanwhile, the Pakistani comrades of the Afghan Taliban are now locked in battle with the Pakistani army, and this has slowed the number of Pakistani volunteers infiltrating across the border to kill American soldiers. These frontier Pashtun tribesmen, who once provided the Afghans with a steady flow of weapons, young fighters and suicide bombers, are suddenly too pinned down to give anything but a trickle of support. Mullah Omar and the other members of the so-called Quetta Shura, or military council, have stayed on the sidelines for fear of losing their covert support from the Pakistani military and the ISI, who hate Karzai and his northern allies and want to see the Taliban back in power and the NATO forces gone from Afghanistan.

Says one top Afghan official: "We and the Americans gave the Pakistanis the addresses of madrasahs [religious schools] where the Taliban are training young recruits and suicide bombers, but the ISI refuses to act." Now that Pakistani authorities are finally realizing that support of an Islamist revival in Afghanistan comes with its own risks at home, that attitude may start to change. Only with the loss of his Pakistani sponsors can Mullah Omar and his Taliban be coaxed into striking a truce with Karzai.

Why the Marines need to pacify (or subdue) Helmand

By Peter Bergen
CNN National Security Analyst
Nawa District, Helmand, Afghanistan

If the southern Afghanistan province of Helmand were a country it would be the world’s leading producer of opium and its derivative, heroin. More than half the world’s heroin originates here – much of it destined for the veins of junkies living in Europe.

In June 2005, U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency officials and Afghan police raided the office of Sher Mohammed Akhundzada, the governor of Helmand, and found nine tons of opium in his office. He is no longer the governor.

According to an unpublished threat assessment by the Afghan army of the security situation as it was this April in Afghanistan which was obtained by CNN, Helmand province had the highest percentage of territory controlled by the Taliban of any of the country’s 34 provinces.

Nearly 60 percent of Helmand in April was fully Taliban-controlled, and the remainder was classified as “high risk” for Taliban attacks.

According to a senior Marine officer 20 percent of the Taliban in Helmand are “ideologues’ who are not from the local area and are influenced by the Pakistan-based central command of the Taliban – such as its leader Mullah Omar. The other 80 percent are local “opportunists” who are making money being paid by the Taliban to do jobs such as planting roadside bombs known as Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs).

U.S. intelligence officials estimate that the Taliban can pay approximately $300 a month to its rank-and-file soldiers. An Afghan policeman is lucky if he makes $100 a month.

Since early July, some 4,500 American U.S. Marines and hundreds of Afghans soldiers have launc hed offensives against the Taliban in Helmand and, according to a senior US Marine officer, as a result the Taliban “are on their arse, literally.”

The officer said that of the 13 districts in Helmand, only one is now fully controlled by the Taliban. However, they continue to maintain a persistent presence in the province and are capable of launching IED attacks at will throughout Helmand.

In Dawa District, in central Helmand, Marines at a dusty, spartan base with no electricity or running water venture out on several-hour foot patrols. They move through canal-fed corn fields armed with metal detectors and a bomb-sniffing dog looking to discover and disable IEDs.

The IEDs range from simple victim- operated bombs, typically pressure plate devices made from wood and springs, to more complex devices that are remotely detonated using a command wire. The corn rows that stand 10-feet high provide an ideal environment in which the IED triggermen can hide.

During World War II, 3 percent of American combat deaths were caused by mines or booby traps. By 1967 during the Vietnam War the figure rose to 9 percent. In Iraq during the latter half of 2005, IEDs were the leading cause of American combat deaths, responsible for 65 percent of all fatalities and half of all nonfatal injuries.

According to Brigadier General Laurence Nicholson, who is in charge of the Marine Brigade in Helmand, an astonishing 80 percent of the casualties of the Marines under his command are now caused by IEDs.

Just one more statistic that helps explain why Helmand remains one of the more dangerous places on the planet.